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ABSTRACT
Toward a Developmental Model of Depression:
Object Representation and Object Loss in
Adolescent and Adult Psychiatric Patients
(September 1979)
Bobbi Fibel, B.A., Emory University
M.S., Ph.D, University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Alexandra Kaplan
The study explored the relationships between factors
presumed to influence one's capacity to bear loss or separa-
tion and a proposed developmental model of depression among
adolescent and adult psychiatric patients. Results general-
ly supported both of the two major objectives of the inves-
tigation. First, support was provided for the validity of
the proposed model of depression. Measures of actual
observed reactions to losses were positively and signifi-
cantly related to measures of the developmental stages of
the model. Further, both measures of the severity of
depression and diagnostic category were also significantly
related to the developmental stage, as predicted. Among
its other advantages over most other approaches, a valid
and reliably measureable developmental model of depression
allows for the systematic study of hypotheses regarding
the role of development in later depressive illness.
Second, the study provided support for the relationship
of object representation to the proposed model. In general,
iv
and as anticipated, measures of object representation cor-
related positively and significantly with both self-
reported and observed measures of the developmental stage.
Contrary to hypotheses, however, this relationship was not
significantly attenuated by the type of event (object loss
versus non-object loss distress)
,
temporal frame of refer-
ence (past versus present) , or the source of information
about reactions (self-reported versus observed)
. Of the
individual difference variables explored, only the severity
of depression and diagnosis measures correlated signifi-
cantly with the developmental stage. The greater the
severity of depression or the more serious the psychologi-
cal disturbance, the lower the developmental stage. Sex,
age, history of life stress, and depressed mood were not
significantly related to measures of developmental stage.
Controlling for the effects of individual difference vari-
ables did not attenuate the relationship between object
representaion and self-reported or observed measures of the
developmental stage of depression. Results are discussed
with respect to implications for a developmental model of
depression and the mediating role of object representation.
Further research to clarify theoretical and methodological
questions was recommended.
V
\TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
ABSTRACT
LIST OF TABLES
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1
Psychodynamic Theories of the Role of Loss
and Separation in Depression 5
The Psychological Meaning of Object Loss and
the Role of Cognition 31
Object Loss 32
The Developmental Study of Loss and
Separation 36
Cognitive Development and Object Constancy .... 44
Developmental Models of Depression 59
The Adolescent Case 59
A Proposed Developmental Model of Depression 79
Statement of the Problem 84
CHAPTER II: METHOD 86
Subjects 86
Experimenters 88
Materials 90
Consent Form 90
Rorschach Ink Blot Test Object Representation
Scale (R-OR) 90
Thematic Apperception Test Object Representa-
tion Scale (TAT-OR) 92
Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) 94
Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (MAACL)
,
Depression Scale (DCL) 95
Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS) 96
Life Events Survey (Modified) (LES-M) 96
Distress Management Self-Report Scale (DMS) 98
Procedure 98
Initial Interview 99
Second Interview
CHAPTER III: RESULTS
CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION ^"^^
BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDICES ^'^^
LIST OF TABLES
1. Means and Standard Deviations for Subjects' Scores
on Measures of Object Representation for
Adolescent and Adult Groups 108
2. Means and Standard Deviations for Subjects' Scores*
on Measures of Distress Management for
Adolescent and Adult Groups 109
3. One Way Analysis of Variance: Effect of Age
of Subject Ill
4. Means and Standard Deviations for Subjects' Scores
on Measures of Object Representation for
Female and Male Groups 112
5. Means and Standard Deviations for Subjects' Scores
on Measures of Distress Management for
Female and Male Groups 113
6. One Way Analysis of Variance: Effect of Sex
of Subject 114
7. Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix for
Measures of Object Representation and Distress
Management 115
8. Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix for
Self-Reported and Observed Measures of
Distress Management 118
9. Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix for
Measures of Object Representation and
Observed Distress Management 119
10. Means and Standard Deviations for Initial
Interview Measures 121
11. Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix for
Measures of Depression and Measures of
Distress Management 122
12. Means and Standard Deviations for Subjects' Scores
on Measures of Distress Management for
Psychotic, Borderline, and Character
Disordered Groups 125
13. Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix for
Diagnosis, Total Past and Present Life Events
Scores, and Measures of Distress Management .... 128
14. Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix for
Past Positive and Negative and Present
Positive and Negative Life Events Scores and
Measures of Distress Management 129
15. First Order Partial Correlation Coefficients
for Measures of Object Representation and
Distress Management Controlling for Vari-
ability due to Age 1^^
vii
16. First Order Partial Correlation Coefficients
for Measures of Object Representation and
Distress Management Controlling for Vari-
ability due to Severity of Depression 134
17. First Order Partial Correlation Coefficients
for Measures of Object Representation and
Distress Management Controlling for Vari-
ability due to Total Past Life Events 136
18. First Order Partial Correlation Coefficients
for Measures of Object Representation and
Distress Management Controlling for Vari-
ability due to Total Present Life Events 138
19. First Order Partial Correlation Coefficients
for Measures of Object Representation and
Distress Management Controlling for Vari-
ability due to Diagnosis 140
viii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Loss of or separation"'' from a libidinal object is
among both the most common and most poignant of human
experiences. Until recently, only its pathogenic signifi-
cance was appreciated. Much of the current literature in
developmental psychology, however, acknowledges its crucial
role in normal psychological development as well as psycho-
pathological variations. Yet theorists remain perplexed as
to the conditions under which loss or separation from a
love object becomes a malignant influence. Further,
individual responses to loss are tremendously varied even
within both the normal and pathological range. No theory
adequately predicts the configuration of one's responses
to the permanent or temporary loss of a significant object.
In its broadest terms this study is an exploration of
the ways in which human reactions to object loss are
structured by one's level of cognitive development. More
specifically, the form of response to object loss— in the
^In the present work, no conceptual distinction is
made between loss and separation except insofar as loss
implies greater permanence and lack of choice, while separa
tions may vary in length and include self-initiated actions
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present case with special reference to adolescents— is
thought to correspond to the developmental level at which
the object is cognitively represented. Theoretically then,
responses to loss experiences may vary from lower to higher
developmental levels along a number of dimensions including
the degree of differentiation of affective expression, the
relative availability of substitute gratifications, and
the defensive repertoire by which the painful experience
of loss is modulated. In the present study, it is pro-
posed that cognitive development of mental representation
of the libidinal object provides valuable reference points
from which to examine a developmental progression of reac-
tions to loss. Further, the current formulation applies
a Piagetian framework as a model in the development of
representations. According to this model, object repre-
sentation proceeds from a sensory-motor level through con-
crete perceptual and iconic levels to a conceptual level
of representation.
While an elaboration of this model must await the
review of its theoretical underpinnings, the three intel-
lectual traditions upon which it rests are already appar-
ent. First, psychoanalytic formulations of depression con-
tribute heavily to the present framework. The work of
major theorists within psychoanalytic circles are reviewed
in relation to the evolution of the study of the role of
internal structures to depressive phenomena. A historical
overview of this literature shows several concurrent theo-
retical progressions. In general, modern theoreticians
place relatively less emphasis on traumatic losses, on the
role of internalized aggression and the superego per se,
stages of psychosexual development, and neurotic defense
mechanisms than early psychoanalysts. Greater emphasis is
given to the psychological meaning of the loss, the relative
strength of ego resources with which to weather the loss,
the quality of object relations, and a wider range of
defensive strategies including psychotic, character dis-
ordered, and borderline defenses.
The second major perspective helping to shape the pre-
sent approach is the psychological meaning of object loss.
The issue is examined in three ways. First, the severe,
but diverse impact of actual traumatic object loss early in
life on later adjustment is reviewed. From this line of
research, the complexity of the relationship between loss
and psychopathology becomes apparent. Secondly then, the
less traumatic and normal separations from the maternal
object in childhood are discussed. The developmental lit-
erature provides a framework from which to understand the
genesis and configuration of psychopathological reactions.
Additionally, this second focus points to the significance
of cognitive maturation. The third subtopic is thus, the
special relevance of Piaget's theories of development of
mental representation for enduring maladaptations to loss
4and separation. Specifically, the integration of Piagetian
nonlibidinal object representation with psychoanalytic
theories of libidinal object representation is explored.
Piagefs developmental schema, derived from investigations
of children's interaction with inanimate objects, may then
be extended to the study of more complex and human objects.
An integration of cognitive theories of mental representa-
tion and psychodynamic theories of object representation
is primarily the contributions of Fraiberg (1969) and
Blatt (1974). They identify the considerable degree of
convergence in the two literatures.
The third and final framework for the present study
is a developmental one. Much of the literature on loss,
separation, and depression has centered on either early
childhood or adulthood. The present investigation con-
trasts adolescents with adults. The significance of adoles-
cence for the current topic is two-fold. Most importantly,
separation--both psychological and physical— first from the
maternal object, later from one's family of origin is the
central development task of this era. Adolescence provides
a rather unique opportunity to investigate the vicissitudes
of the drama of emergent adulthood. Traditionally, the
period is viewed as something of a psychological last chance
to right whatever damage childhood wrought. While this view
has been challenged by recent adult developmental theorists,
adolescence remains a time in which psychological structure
is relatively more fluid than the period preceding or fol-
lowing it. Second, cognitive development is said to be
completed only at adolescence. Theoretically, then, since
separation issues are in the forefront for the adolescent
and insofar as their capacity to successfully negotiate the
psychological demands is mediated by cognitive development,
adolescence is a vital developmental crossroads.
Following the three major literature review sections
(Psychodynamic theories of the role of loss and separation
in depression. The psychological meaning of loss and the
role of cognition, and a developmental model of depression)
,
a developmental framework is proposed based on the available
empirical and theoretical work. The present investigation
tests the hypothesis that one's predominating level of
object representation mediates the relationship between
loss and separation and the developmental stage of the
reaction to it. Other variables (the diagnositc category,
the history of losses, and demographic factors) are also
exam.ined. The results of the investigation are discussed
in relation to the viability of a developmental model of
depression which is anchored in a cognitively-grounded object
relations theory.
Psychodynamic Theories of the Role of
Loss and Separation in Depression
"The great source of terror in infancy is solitude."
(James, 1890)
From the outset, object loss and depression were power-
fully linked in psychoanalytic theory. An historical over-
view reveals much that is controversial in the various
explications of the nature of the relationship between loss
and separation; however, psychoanalytic theorists agree on
several basic postulates. Regardless of orientation,
significance is given to the subjective experience of object
loss and only secondarily to the event by which it is pre-
cipitated. The distinction is a crucial one, for it
broadens what is meant by object loss to include imagined
losses, events which remind one of or threaten loss,
developmentally more primitive experiences which are
interpreted as object loss. While the extension of the
meaning of object loss to occurrences other than the per-
manent separation from a loved one presents many theoreti-
cal and methodological difficulties, psychological sophis-
tication demands it. The broadening of the concept of ob-
ject loss allows one to explore loss experiences along a
continuum of intensity and to contrast the impact of equi-
valent intensity across various developmental eras, per-
sonality structures, or other relevant dimensions.
Although the parallel development of the capacity to
bear object loss and object representation are most central
to the present investigation, much consideration will be
given to the evolution of psychodynamic theories of depres-
sion. The intent here is two-fold. First, in relation to
7a developmental perspective on the impact of object loss,
psychoanalytic theorists initially turned their attention
to the role of object loss as its significance in depres-
sion became apparent. Although early writings were largely
restricted to its pathogenic impact, the groundwork was
laid for the genetic study of object loss which inevitably
led to a greater understanding of the role of object loss
in normal development as well. Second, much of the early
formulations of internalized representations of the libid-
inal object were discussed in relation to the object loss
precipitated depression. Thus, psychoanalytic literature
on depression converges on the present investigation in
two ways. Each of these two thematic strands, the rela-
tionship between pathological and normal mourning develop-
mentally, and the interrelationship between object represen-
tation and the capacity to tolerate object loss, will be
emphasized in the following review and brought into sharper
focus in the subsequent section.
Abraham (1911, 1916, 1924) initiated the psychoanalytic
investigation of depression. Initially he compared depres-
sion to obsessive neurosis emphasizing the depressive 's
anality and intensely ambivalent object ties as points of
confluence. Amending this view, however, in later work,
Abraham drew attention to the underlying oral fixations
often present in depressives. He contended that depressed
individuals had inordinate oral needs manifested by eating.
8talking, sucking, or by insatiable demands for orally
expressed affection, and extreme sensitivities to oral
frustrations
.
In the later papers Abraham proposed a primal depres-
sion which is a consequence of injury to one's infantile
narcissism. The locus of the injury lies in the Oedipal
period and prior to its repression and is initiated by "dis-
appointments in love." Subsequently the individual is less
able to preserve the object. According to Abraham, hostile
and destructive impulses toward the object predominate,
thereby making retention of a relationship to the object
problematic
.
Abraham's contribution to current formulations is his
effort to link the quality of the depressive 's interpersonal
style to internal forces. Of course, Abraham's explications
are grounded in drive theory, but nonetheless pose the
depressive 's dilemma in terms of a need for and yet diffi-
culty in retaining the object.
Freud, after discarding his original neurological
explanation of depression (1896) postulated a dynamic,
structural theory. In Mourning and Melancholia (Freud,
1917) he proposed that melancholia and mourning are analog-
ous, both being responses to object loss. In mourning, an
actual loss initiates a process of detachment of libido
from the object. The loss in melancholia, according to
Freud, need not be restricted to actual loss of the object,
but may include fantasied loss or the withdrawal of
cathexis. As he states, both mourning and melancholia
share attributes such as dejection, constricted interest,
and lowered activity. Freud contended that the severity
of the melancholic • s self-depreciation in response to loss
is the most crucial differentiation from mourning.
Efforts to understand the disruption of self-esteem
that characterized melancholia led Freud to develop the
concept of identification. He reasoned that the chronic
self-vilification of the melancholic is the result of mis-
directed aggression against the object. He observed of the
self-accusations that, "...the most violent of them are
hardly applicable to the patient himself, but that with
insignificant modifications they do fit someone else, some
person whom the patient loves, has loved, or ought to
love." (p. 169)
Reconstructing the process, then, Freud argued that
following the choice of the object, and cathexis to it,
that some real or imagined disappointment undermines the
relationship. Then, unlike the normal case in which libid-
inal interest is withdrawn and transferred to a new object,
the cathexis is withdrawn and the energy taken into the
ego. The energy normally available for new cathexes in the
external world (object libido) , is used to establish an
identification of the ego with the abandoned object. He
wrote.
Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego
...In this way the loss of the object became
transformed into a loss in the ego, and the
10
conflict between the ego and the loved person
transformed into a cleavage between the criti-
cizing faculty of the ego and the ego as
altered by the identification. (p. 170)
The withdrawal of libidinal cathexis from objects (ob-
ject libido) into the ego (ego libido) Freud considered
narcissistic regression. He reasoned then that the propen-
sity for such narcissism in the face of loss must lie in
the narcissistic nature of the original object choice, the
loss of which stimulates the regression.
Vulnerability to melancholia as a response to loss is,
in Freud's view, further determined by the degree of ambiva-
lence contained in the relationship. Thus, in addition to
the internalization of libidinal cathexis, aggressive
drives are taken into the ego and become part of the internal
substitute for the lost object. The depressive 's self-
punitiveness is then a function of identification with
ambivalently the loved object.
In a subsequent work, Freud (1923) detailed the defusion
of ambivalent cathexes into their libidinal and sadistic
components in the course of pathognomonic intro jection.
Their defusion makes available to the superego the pure
culture of the death instinct previously muted by its fusion
with libidinal, conserving impulses. The potential for
suicide is the result of this unleashing of destructive
impulses which may overwhelm the ego.
Unforturnately , Freud only alluded to mania and other
11
forms of response to object loss. This omission limits what
is learned about the relationship of predisposing to factors
precipitating events on one hand, and their impact on
internal structure and the topography of responses on the
other hand. Nonetheless, Freud firmly planted melancholia
along the same continuum with normal mourning, making object
loss the unifying theme. The groundwork was laid for the
differentiation of developmental levels in the capacity to
resolve object loss.
Freud placed the spotlight brilliantly on the internal-
ization of those features of the lost object which charac-
terize the quality of the relationship to it. Thus, both
in mourning and melancholia it is as though a record of
the relationship to the object—and not simply some eidetic
image of it— is preserved by identification. Freud limited
the dimensions along which this internal representation
occurred on a continuum from positive (libidinal) to nega-
tive (aggressive) valence. Other theorists reviewed later
have extended Freud's concept of identification to include
other dimensions, notably the qualities of boundaries
between representations (Blatt & Ritzier, 1974; Blatt &
Wild, 1975; Fisher & Cleveland, 1968; Landis, 1970; Zucker,
1958) and the degree of object constancy (Blatt, 1974; A.
Freud, 1972; Klein, 1934; Rochlin, 1965). These other
dimensions and their theoretical relation to vulnerability
to object loss has its roots, then, in Freud's initial
12
forays into the process of internalization in melancholia.
Rado's (19 28) major contributions to a psychoanalytic
theory of depression are the addition of the concepts of
splitting to Freud's idea of pathognomonic introjection
and the postulation of reparation as the aim of depres-
sive symptoms. He proposed that depressives, owing to
strong narcissistic cravings and little tolerance for
narcissistic frustrations, are likely to depend upon others,
particularly parents, for their source of self-esteem.
They therefore respond with excessive contrition to any
violation of parental standards in an attempt to make
reparation and forestall the loss of the object. Rado
argued that this process of reconciliation becomes intern-
alized so that.
Instead of the early process of putting matters
right in actual fact with the parents, we have
the purely psychical process by which he puts
them right with his superego as happens later
in melancholia. (1928, p. 425)
Regarding this splitting, Rado contended that in early
development, pleasurable and painful experiences achieve
psychic representation as discrete entities or objects.
The pleasure-giving mother is represented as "bad mother."
Normal development brings about the unification of these
split representations of the object. By contrast, depres-
sives invoke splitting regressively as a defense against
the aggressive impulses toward the object. The good aspect
is taken into the superego, the bad aspect is introjected
13
by the ego, and the superego then directs its sadism toward
the ego in order to rid the ego of its bad object. The
process would then restore the depressive to an unambivalent
state of self-esteem, that is, unchallenged by the threat of
either aggressive impulses toward the object or internal
danger from the bad object introject.
Fenichel (1945, 1968), like Rado, emphasized the rela-
tionship between depression and loss of self-esteem. In
his view, self-esteem may be diminished in two ways, either
by the inaccessibility of the object and its supplies early
in development or by "bad conscience" arising from the
transgression of internalized standards later in develop-
ment. The latter serves as a precaution against the pos-
sibility of loss.
The extent of trauma associated with object loss is
a consequence of the nature of the infant's attachment to
the object. Fenichel viewed the attachment as a product of
the infant's projection of her/his belief in one's own omni-
potence onto the parents and her/his subsequent attempt to
regain this sense of omnipotence through participation in
the relationship. He wrote,
He needs this participation, the feeling of
being loved, in the same way that he pre-
viously needed milk. Now the succession of
states in which the child feels alone and
therefore experiences a kind of self-
depreciation--we call it annihilation--and
states in which he feels loved and his self-
esteem re-established. (1945, p. 388)
Fenichel counted among the predisposing factors in
14
depression both extraordinary losses through death or pro-
longed separation and the more commonplace experiences
like the birth of a sibling or frustration of Oedipal
wishes. The severity of the narcissistic regression in
depression is a function of the extent to which relations
in the external world are supplanted by "relations within
the personality."
Fenichel's formulation underscored the shifts in the
subjective meaning of loss across different developmental
eras. Although Fenichel used self-esteem as the unifying
construct, he too recognized that the impact of loss on
one's self-regard is mediated by internal images of the
relationship between self and other.
Bibring advanced an ego psychological approach to
depression which centered on "...the ego's shocking aware-
ness of its helplessness in regard to its aspiration" (1953,
p. 39). Depression is fundamentally intrasystemic , residing
primarily in the ego. Self-puni tiveness and other phenomena
which involve the remaining structures, arise secondarily
as part of a restitutive process. Rejecting the importance
of the oral fixation per se, Bibring emphasized the fixa-
tion to helplessness and the powerlessness of the ego.
Helplessness, according to Bibring, bears direct rela-
tion to a phase-specific developmental sequence of narcis-
sistic aspirations. The attainment of the goals is essen-
tial to the maintenance of self-esteem. Failure then
15
deflates self-esteem and initiates depression which is
characterized by a sense of the futility of striving. in
the oral phase narcissistic aspirations are focused on the
need to gain affection, to be loved and cared for, or the
counterdependent need to be independent. Mastery of the
body, drives, and objects is critical to the anal phase.
In the phallic stage, aspirations are directed toward suc-
cessful competition, the need to be strong and admired, and
to avoid vulnerability. In sum, narcissistic aspirations
concern attaining love and competence as they are flavored
by the conflicts of each phase of psychosexual development.
Susceptibility to depression is a consequence of
several factors. First, one's constitutional tolerance for
persistent frustration establishes an individual threshold.
Then, the severity and duration of helplessness during
infancy influences one's predisposition. Further, later
developmental factors may modulate or magnify the intensity
and threshold for helpless states. Finally, the nature of
the precipitating event influences the current state. In
conclusion, depression is understood by Bibring as one of
the basic ego states, that of broken down self-regard, which
is revived by blows to one's self-esteem to the degree to
which these factors are present.
The concept of depression as an ego state with phase-
specific referents adds much to a developmental model of
depression. However, Bibring 's model of ego development
16
is rudimentary, particularly insofar as he fails to incor-
porate the observations of Abramham, Freud, or Rado regard-
ing the quality of object relations. Both Bibring's and
Fenichel's conceptualizations rely on a rather mechanistic
construction of self-esteem which remains unintegrated with
either the real or internalized world of objects.
Rubinfine (1968) further critiqued Bibring for having
excluded consideration of the drives. Rubinfine (1962)
reintroduced the role of aggression in depression. Pro-
longed states of tension result from the premature disrup-
tion of the narcissistic mother-infant unit. Such tension
leads to the precocious differentiation of the aggressive
drive and the distinction between self and nonself. Depres-
sion is the affect which then signals the unattainability
of an aim due to the weakness of the ego and as a clinical
syndrome is concerned primarily with restoring past plea-
sure. Guilt is the product of aggression toward the frus-
trating mother. Few theorists, Beres (1966) being a promi-
nant exception, however, continue to advocate a central
role of aggressive drives and guilt in depression.
Jacobson (1946, 1953, 1954, 1957, 1966, 1971) is among
the foremost proponents of an ego analytic view of depres-
sion. After taking a long, deep bow toward psychosomatic
facets of depression, Jacobson focused on the structural
rather than the instinctual and dynamic components of
depressive states. In her view instinctual regressions are
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common to all psychoses. Fantasies of cannibalistic incor-
poration and anal-sadistic ejection accompany the dissolu-
tion of object and self representations and restitutive
partial fusions. In distinguishing depression, she con-
cerns herself primarily with the structural locus of these
fusions.
In Jacobson's framework, the system ego consists of
the self and object representations and associated ego
functions. The normal development of representations often
fuse and confuse the self and the object. With development,
self and object are defused, but are subject to periodic
refusions whenever the child experiences gratitif ication
,
physical contact, and closeness with the mother. Progres-
sively, the child strives to attain the sense of oneness
actively through imitation as well as passively through
the receipt of pleasure.
Advancement to the subsequent stage of identification
presupposes that the child, via perceptual and cognitive
maturation, begins to develop increasingly realistic self
and object representations. These representations are also
increasingly more firmly bounded. The child relinquishes
the desire to merge with the other and replaces it with
efforts to become like the love objects in the future.
Further, these efforts are increasingly aimed at particular
features of the object rather than the total object and
thus give rise to partial identification which may then be
18
blended with the self image.
Over time, the taking on of partial identification is
better matched to the realistic assessment of the self and
make lasting changes in the ego. These contribute to
enduring object and self representations and to stable
object relations and ego functions.
Parallel to the developm.ent of self and other repre-
sentations, each developmental stage is characterized by a
particular fear which the child must overcome. The point
of vulnerability relevant to depression occurs when the
child becomes aware of its helplessness and dependency.
She commented,
The loss of belief in his own omnipotence
will teach him to prefer security to plea-
sure and, hence, to accept a strong love-
object that gives him security, though it
may deprive him of pleasure. (1953, p. 58)
The severe instinctual and structural regression com-
mon to all psychoses is attributable to insufficient neutral-
ization of aggressive and libidinal energies. Development of
firm bounded self and object representations are forestalled
and structures remain fluid. In psychotic depression, owing
to the greater level of differentiation as compared to
schizophrenics, it is the threat of dissolution and loss of
identity and not the experience of dissolution and loss of
identity which characterizes the condition. Similarly, the
depressive treats her/himself as if s/he were the love
object whereas the schizophrenic behaves as if s/he believes
19
her/himself to be the object. The depressives' symptoms
serve to maintain a dependent relationship to the object,
while the schizophrenic seeks to sever it. She remarked,
In the depressed state the attempt to safe-
guard the libidinal cathexis of the love
object leads first to an increasing merger
of the bad, worthless love object image with
the self-image and sometimes even to a pro-jection of the "good, worthy" self onto the
object. The failure of this defense promotes
the increasing withdrawal of cathexis from
the realistic love object and the revival
of infantile "bad" parental images. Proc-
esses of restitution set in, resulting in
the renunciation of a punitive, sadistic,
but powerful and indestructible love-object
image which is set up on the superego or in
the self-critical parts of the ego. (1953,
pp. 259-260)
The relation of these processes to self-esteem is
straightforward in Jacobson's theory. Self- judgment assesses
the relationship between the ego-ideal and self-representa-
tion. The greater the discrepancy, then, the lower the
self-esteem. Thus Jacobson, unlike Fenichel and Bibring, is
able to tie the ego function of the regulation of self-esteem
to object relations. Vulnerability to depression is related
to specific ego v/eakness of the individual in which the love
object is libidinally cathected in idealized and pov/erful
terms while the self, in contrast, is aggressively cathected
in devalued and dependent terms. The pathogenic potential
of frustration, hurt, and disappointment are therefore
quite high.
Other theorists within the ego analytic tradition vary
more in degree than in substance with Jacobson's formulations.
20
Zetzel (1953, I960, 1965) placed greater emphasis on the
adaptive aspects of the capacity to tolerate depression and
other affects and thus to mobilize adaptive efforts to modi-
fy the sources of felt helplessness. In the earliest stage,
the infant relies upon a sense of omnipotence, but must
learn to recognize and tolerate depression without distor-
tions of realtiy. The development of this capacity depends
upon the sufficient stabilization of object relations.
According to Zetzel, a second phase of mastery extends
up to the onset of the Oedipal phase. The critical task
here, which then comes to complement the earlier accomplish-
ment, is the resolution of the polarity of excessive pas-
sivity on one hand and an underestimation of reality con-
straints on the other hand.
Pathological depression results from a lack of basic
trust and weak positive ego identification in Zetzel 's
framework. Depression represents an ego state characterized
by the loss of self-esteem and bound up with the inability
to renounce an omnipotent self-image.
Benedek (19 75) discussed four fundamental factors in
depressive illness: ambivalence, guilt, loss of an object,
and loss of self-esteem. Although the roots of the "depres-
sive constellation" rest clearly in the oral stage and draw
on the m.other- infant interaction as their prototype, the
clinical syndrome in Benedek ' s view cannot be attributed to
an infant prior to the second or anal stage of development.
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She wrote.
In summary, the primary root of depression
IS the instinctual ambivalence, which enhances
via the primary object relationship (the depres-
sive constellation), a disposition to depression. Fleet-ing moods of depressive affect occur in infancy
especially during the second half of the first
year. But one can speak of depression as an
affective disorder or as a "narcissistic disorder"
only when the development has reached a level of
ego autonomy, the loss of which may be feared
(1975, pp. 344-345)
The depressive constellation refers to the negative
pole of the primary object representation of the infant
which evolves through ambivalent processes (separation) of
alimentation. The depressive constellation, as distin-
guished from either depressive illness or mood, consists of
the negative introject, the sum of trust-breaking experiences
with caretaker. She proposed that the greater the predomi-
nance of negative introjects over positive ones, the lower
the tolerance for frustration, the greater intensity are
the negative aspects of interactions, and the greater is
the disposition to depression. The depressive constella-
tion is, "the phase of incipient ego development during
which the object of instinctual needs appears to the infant
as part of himself." (1975, p. 343)
Benedek shared Zetzel's focus on the early mother-infant
interaction as prototypical, but Benedek is more specific
as to the mechanisms by which the quality of the early
relationship is preserved. Both approach the issue of pre-
disposition to depression in terms of the relative balance
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Of positive versus negative experience and introjects.
Zetzel and Benedek are in agreement with Jacobson regarding
the centrality of the capacity to overcome the infantile
dependency in order to avert depression.
Zetzel, however, gave relatively greater weight than
her predecessors to the developmental achievement of the
capacity to bear depressive affect that is the natural
consequence of losses. Jacobson and Benedek, for example,
seem more concerned with the misfortune and pathogenic
implications of having had to endure the experience at all.
Zetzel 's approach is a notable advance for it allows for
the differentiation of responses to object loss along a
continuum on which depression represents a relatively
advanced response. In this respect Zetzel joins Klein
(1934) and the current conception of depression.
In several respects the work of Sandler and Joffee
(1965) summarized an ego analytic perspective. They, not
unlike Bibring, placed helplessness at the core of their
conceptualization of depression. Diverging from Bibring,
however, they linked the helpless state to mental pain rather
than to fluctuations in self-esteem. By mental pain Sandler
and Joffee meant the discrepancy between the actual and
ideal state of self, a concept similar to Jacobson 's descrip-
tion of self- judgment which she had associated with levels
of self-esteem. They contended that once object constancy
is established the object representation becomes an essential
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component of the ideal state. Loss of the object is then
not pathogenic in and of itself, but only insofar as the
object is the vehicle for a state of self.
In Sandler and Joffee's formulation, vulnerability to
depression is a function of the inability to defend against
pain, to discharge aggression adequately, or to reduce in-
tolerable cathexes. Its resolution, they noted, depends
upon the success of the individuation process in which the
pursuit of the ideal state is abandoned in favor of new
ideals which are both ego and reality syntonic. They con-
cluded that depressive responses subsequently interfere
with the adaptive individuation efforts.
Sandler and Joffee have extended Zetzel's considera-
tion of the wider context of loss and separation in a
normal developmental sequence. While their stress on drive
discharge adds little to the object relational perspective,
they recognized the vital relationship between the degree
of object constancy and relative freedom from the precipi-
tous induction of states of helplessness in response to
object loss. This observation, alluded to earlier by
Freud (1917), Abraham (1924), Klein (1934), Anna Freud
(1952), and Rochlin (1965), has been most extensively studied
and confirmed empirically by Mahler and her associates (Mah-
ler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975).
Prior to an examination of the experimental literature
on the relationship of object loss and cognitive development,
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a review of the work of Klein (1934) is instructive.
Klein (1934) was among the first to conceptualize
depression in normal developmental terras. She construed
the clinical syndrome as the failure to resolve the depres-
sive position in infancy, the depressive position being the
second of the two developmental postures which Klein posited.
In the first, the paranoid-schizoid position, the infant
ego struggles to keep the innate and acquired persecutory
object from overwhelming the ideal object. The infant
endeavors to introject the good and to project the bad. The
defensive splitting of good and bad aspects of the object
into distinct entities orders experience and sets the pre-
conditions for later reintegration. The dual processes of
introjection and projection with their myriad vicissitudes
serve also to protect the good object from annihilation by
separating it and controlling it. Relations to the external
object are established through a third mechanism, that of
projective identification. Projected parts of the self and
internal objects are repossessed by identification with
these externalized parts of oneself in the other.
The successful management of the anxieties of the
paranoid-schizoid position paves the way for the depressive
position. The predominance of good over bad experience is
a precondition for this next developmental stage, for
through it the ego comes to believe in the prevalence of
the ideal over the persecutory object and thereby of the
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fortitude of the life instinct. The ego's tolerance of its
own aggression grows, the need for primitive defenses abates,
and drives toward the integration of the ego and the object
can ascend.
The depressive phase of development, generally ushered
in between 4 and 5 months of age, is heralded by the in-
fant's recognition of and relation to the whole object.
Mother is now recognized and perceived as a whole object.
Within her representation, diverse and even contradictory
features are tolerated. Fundamentally, the infant progres-
sively realizes that the "good mother" whom s/he loves and
the "bad mother" whom s/he hates is the same person.
New anxieties are created by the achievement of ambi-
valence. The fear that her/his own destructive im.pulses
have destroyed or will destroy the loved object and source
of gratification is now the m.ost central concern. Further,
the fear is compounded by the infant's realization of the
essential autonomy of the external object upon which s/he
is dependent. The resolution of this new dilemma involves
the intensification of the introjective mechanism in response
to the increased need to possess the external object.
Of crucial significance to the present perspective is
Klein's assertion that the integrated infant can rem.ember
and retain love for the good object even while hating it.
This is the basis for mourning the lost object and for guilt,
feelings which first make their appearance in the depressive
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phase and are central to it. Klein explicated,
...ego comes to a realization for its love
for a good object, a whole object and in
addition a real object, together with an
overwhelming feeling of guilt towards it.
Full identification with the object based on
the libidinal attachment, first to the breast,
then to the whole person, goes hand in hand
with anxiety for it (of its disintegration)
,
with guilt and remorse, with a sense of res-
ponsibility for preserving it intact against
persecutors and the id, and with sadness
relating to expectations of the impending
loss of it. (1934, p. 290)
Sorrow and concern for the lost (internal) object lead
to attempts to make reparation to the object. "But the ego
cannot as yet believe enough in the benevolence of the ob-
ject and in its ov/n capacity to make restitution" (p. 266)
.
Klein proposed that the anxiety over the fate of the inter-
nal good objects is correlated with the fate of the external
objects with which the child is identified. It is for this
reason, in her view, that the loss of the mother is so men-
acing to the child and leads to an exaggeration of the
child's cathexis to the mother in order to prevent it.
The resolution of the depressive position also depends
in part upon the success of defensive splitting. Splitting
at this developmental level is differentiated from earlier
splitting in that it is "carried out on planes which grad-
ually become increasingly nearer to reality.
This goes on until love for the real and internalized
objects and trust in them are well established." The use
of denial for the purposes of consistency and control may
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give way. Segal (1964), a reviewer of Klein's work, observed,
"The acceptance of psychic reality involves the renunciation
of omnipotence and magic, the lessening of splitting and the
withdrawal of projective identification. It means the accep-
tance of the idea of separateness~dif ferentiation of one's
own self from one's parents, with all the conflict that it
implies." (p. 102)
Failure to master the developmental task of the depres-
sive position results in the predominance of one or another
flight mechanism which serve to deny the dependence, to
deny depressive feelings, or to deny the value of the object
in order to defend against loss. The propensity to rely on
manic defenses is to be understood in relation to the pain-
fulness of the depression itself, or as Klein put it,
...the relentless severity (of the superego)
in the case of the melancholic becomes more
intelligible. The persecutions and demands
of bad internalized object; the attacks of
such objects upon one another (especially
that represented by the sadistic coitus of
parents) ; the urgent necessity to fulfill
the very strict demands of the "good ob-
jects" and to protect and placate them with-
in the ego, with the resultant hatred of the
id; the constant uncertainty as to the "good-
ness" of a good object, which causes it so
readily to become transformed into a bad one
--all these factors continue to produce in
the ego a sense of being prey to contradic-
tory and impossible claims from within, a
condition which is felt as bad conscience."
(1975, pp. 267-268)
Klein's formulation of depression and defenses against
it significantly advanced an understanding of the relation-
ship between the drives, object relations, and ego resources
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in the developing capacity to perceive and tolerate object
loss. While ego analysts universally condemn her trans-
position of these processes into early infancy, much of
their formulations draw heavily from Klein's theory, par-
ticularly with respect to object relational assumptions.
Klein's approach, in spite of the unlikelihood of her time-
table for the development of these complex cognitive cap-
acities, integrated the emergence of forms of representa-
tion with defensive mechanisms more fully than the ego
analytic theories.
In the preceding selective review of psychodynamic
formulations of the role of loss and separation in develop-
ment, a number of convergences become apparent. First, the
significance of such experiences is universally appreciated.
Although, in general, loss is considered traumatic and dis-
ruptive of development, increasingly this is thought of as
a matter of degree and timing in a developmental sense.
Additionally, considerable agreement is found among psycho-
dynamic theorists as to the locus of disruption in the ego
or some aspect of its functioning. Increasingly, conflicts
which arise in the presence of object loss are seen as
intrasystemic , that is, residing within the ego. The nature
of conflicts are differently conceived by the various
theorists; however, nearly all major approaches recognize
the role of internal representations of self and other in
mediating responses to loss or separation.
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To some degree divergences in psychodynamic formula-
tions bear a relationship to differing conceptions of the
role of the ego in weathering loss, and the conceptualiza-
tion of that which is experienced as lost. Three approaches
may be delineated on this basis. First, early formulations
placed relatively greater emphasis on the loss of need
gratification supplied by the object (Abraham, 1924; Freud,
1917; Rado, 19 28) . Later formulations have focused on the
loss of an ego state associated with the object, the content
of which is developmentally determined (Bibring, 19 53;
Fenichel, 1945)
.
Still more recent is the idea of a threat
to one's self representation, or identity (Jacobson, 1971;
Zetzel, 1965) . These three conceptualizations of the charac-
ter of the loss are intimately related to formulations of
both the way in which it is experienced by the individual,
how it is negotiated, and the nature of defenses against it.
In the first instance, object loss is conceived of
as the loss of need gratification. Loss is then experienced
as deprivation which results in fixation at a particular
psychosexual state, and invokes a defenseive repertoire.
With formulations involving the loss of an ego state
come an understanding of the experience of loss as helpless-
ness. The locus of attempts to manage the loss are con-
ceived of in terms of ego functions like sublimation and
drive neutralization which act to compensate the loss.
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Defenses against the experience of loss involve the capacity
to actively seek and acquire compensatory gratifications
through which the ego's sense of helplessness is ameliorated.
In the last case, loss is viewed as a threat to the
representation of the self. The ability to master such
threats is a function of the degree of constancy, bounded-
ness, and integration of the self representation at the
point of loss. Finally, defenses against the experience
of loss are conceived of as premature differentiation of
representations which are fixed, restrictive, and more
vulnerable than a more gradual process of differentiation.
While these three approaches to the role of loss in
development are neither in theory nor in practice mutually
exclusive, few theorists have acknowledged that explora-
tions of one sphere rather than another has different
implications for theories of normal and pathological develop-
ment and for the treatment of disturbances in which diffi-
culties around the resolution of loss or separation experi-
ences is prominent. Goldberg (1975) , following his review
of the evolution of psychoanalytic theories of depression,
cautioned against a search for causes or primary factors
in depression for this reason. He commented, "we notice
the child's aggression and depression while we are unaware
of the mother's feelings and reactions and totally oblivious
to the social factors that may be operating ... observation
per se is an artifact in scientific investigation" (p. 38).
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In the present investigation, the focus on the issue of
object representation is recognized as an artificial frac-
tionization of the observing field, distortions of which
will remain to be resolved in subsequent studies.
The mediation of responses to object loss or separa-
tion aspects of the internalized image of the object is,
however, too little understood. Unfortunately, psychody-
namic theorists have rarely applied their clinical findings
to a broader arena of observations. Some empirical support
is available for several basic assumptions including the
relationship between object loss and psychopathology , the
significance of loss and separation in normal and abnormal
development, and the interrelationship between general cog-
nitive development and progressively advancing levels of
object representation. In the next section, these litera-
tures are reviewed and the latter topic is integrated with-
in a comprehensive theoretical framework proposed by
Blatt (1974)
.
The Psychological Meaning of_ Objec t Loss
^^"^ '^he Role of Cognition
In this section an attempt is made to tie together
three strands of experimental work; retrospective studies
of the impact of loss on subsequent psychopathology, a
developmental approach to loss and separation, and cognitive
development. The intent of such a review is to trace out
possible parallel lines of development toward a developmental
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object relation view of the capacity to bear loss.
Object Loss
Historically, object loss was studied retrospectively
in relation to psychopathology generally, and depression
in particular. Theoretical formulations of depression all
recognized the etiological significance of object loss.
Even while theorists are more concerned with subjective
experience of losses, the fundamental event is the loss it-
self. Researchers then set out to establish the validity
of the relationship between actual loss and depression.
To researchers' dismay, studies of the relationship
between depression and early object loss or separation is
equivocal. The results of many studies (Bergmann & Freud,
1965; Bowlby, 1969a, 1969b; Heinicke & Westheimer, 1956;
Provence & Lipton, 1962; Spitz & Wolfe, 1946) support the
relationship between early object loss and depression.
Retrospective studies by Brown (19 61) and Dennehy (19 66)
comparing depressives to other clinical populations found
a higher incidence of parental loss through death some time
in the first 15 years of life. Studies by Beck, Sethi, and
Tuthill (1963) and Munro (1966) also offered support for a
positive relationship between severity of depressive ill-
ness and permanent parental loss in childhood.
Other studies, however, contradicted the hypothesis
that early object loss predisposes a child to depression
in adulthood. Perris (1966) compared
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unipolar depressives, bipolar depressives, and normals for
the frequency of broken homes and found no differences among
groups. Gregory (1966a, 1966b) failed to find support for
Brown's or Dennehy ' s contention of a disproportionate
incidence of early parental loss among depressives as com-
pared to other clinical populations. Several studies indi-
cated that parental loss in childhood may precipitate other
psychiatric disorders (Archibald, Bell, Miller, & Tuddenham,
1962; Blum & Rosenweig, 1944; Hildegard & Newman, 1963;
Pollack, Malzberg, & Fuller, 1939; Wohl
,
1956). Granville-
Grossman (1968)
,
after an extensive review of the literature
on early loss or deprivation concluded that evidence did not
support the higher incidence of loss among depressives. He
cited methodological problems, however, which may have
accounted for discrepant results. Among them were the
criteria for diagnosis and selection of experimental con-
trols, the confounding of social class with parental mor-
tality rates, ages of patients, and ages of parents at the
time of loss. Nonetheless, it would appear that early
object loss may have a nonspecific negative impact on
development under certain circumstances.
More recently, researchers have attended to a broader
range of stressful phenomena in relation to precipitating
factors in depression. Most notably, Paykel, Myers, Dienelt,
Klerman, Lindenthal, and Pepper (1969) matched depressed
subjects with normal controls and compared their total life
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events scores, individual life events scores, and their
categorization of events for the preceding six months.
Information was gathered by both paper and pencil measures
and interviews. They reported that depressives recalled
nearly three times as many stressful life events compared
to normals. Categorization of the events into areas of
social activity (employment, family, marital, health, and
legal spheres) did not reveal differences between groups.
Depressives, however, did report more events which were
both undesirable and indicative of exits from the social
field. Death and separation as well as events such as job
termination, departure from school, or retirement are
included in this category. These data offer limited sup-
port for the relationship between certain types of loss and
depression. Mitigating against such a conclusion is both
the retrospective nature of the study and the theoretical
question of linking precipitating and causal factors.
Regarding the former, evidence suggests that depressives sys-
tematically distort their past and selectively recall nega-
tive events (Loeb, Beck, Diggory, & Tuthill, 1967; Lipton,
1970; Parkes, 1970) . Further, Paykel and his associates
aptly noted that all individuals do not become clinically
depressed given such a life events profile. Their data do
not shed light on individual differences in responses to
these events.
Parkes' (1964) study of the role of adult bereavement
as a precipitant of depression adds support to Paykel et al.
with respect to the consideration of the quality of stress.
In a sample of psychiatric patients he found that the loss
of a spouse within the last 6 months, but not the loss of
a parent, was significantly greater than in the general
population. Bereaved patients were found to be significantly
more likely than nonbereaved patients to be diagnosed de-
pressed. A later study by Parkes (1965), comparing hospi-
talized and nonpsychiatric bereaved widows, found that the
hospitalized group had more difficulty accepting the reality
of loss and expressed more self-blame or guilt toward the
deceased spouse.
Houston (1971) and others rightly cautioned against
drawing conclusions as to the role of bereavement in depres-
tion. Prospective research is needed to clarify the
extent to which bereaved adults distort their past, the
role of other sources of vulnerability to depression among
bereaved patients, the impact of psyc?iiatric hospitalization
per se
,
and the confounding of the diagnosis of depression
with the fact of loss.
Thus, as in the psychodynamic literature and in clini-
cal observations, broad demographic research points to,
but cannot confirm, the significance of the subjective
meaning of the loss to the individual. Most approaches also
presume that the age and stage at v/hich losses or separa-
tions occur are crucial determinants of the degree to which
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later losses are pathogenic (Moriarty, 1967) . For these
reasons, the role of loss and separation in the course of
early development is now reviewed.
The Developmental Study of Loss and Separation
Naturalistic observations of children's separation from
mother revealed that normal children between the ages of two
and four show considerable distress when separated from
mother, crying and calling for her or seeming to search dis-
appointingly. Such reactions seemed to peak at about age
three (Heathers, 1954; Murphy, 1962; Shirley, 1942; Shirley &
Poyntz, 1941)
.
Experimental studies confirm the observations of child-
ren in relatively natural settings and extend the findings
across the first several years of life (Ainsworth & Bell,
1970; Ainsworth & Wittig, 1969; Arsenian, 1943; Cox & Camp-
bell, 1968; Maccoby & Feldman, 1972; Rheingold, 1969)
.
Bowlby (1973) summarized the findings of a consistent
developmental sequence of reactions to maternal separation.
In the earliest months of life, the infant gradually comes
to discriminate and prefer a particular attachment figure.
Signs of differential responding to caretakers is first
observed in great number and intensity between the sixteenth
and twenty-sixth weeks. The vast majority of infants firmly
establish such a bond by 6 months of age. Conversely, the
full range of separation responses is not seen prior to this.
Research by Schaffer (1958) revealed a shift from a
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bewildered response to active protest and fretting at about
twenty-eight weeks of age. Further, the infant's response
to mother's return also changed in the seventh month from
normal responsivity which paralleled their reactions to the
approach of strangers to desperate clinging which markedly
contrasted their negative, frightened responses to strangers
in her absence. Schaffer speculated that the shift was
contiguous with and related to the infant's development
toward object constancy.
The quality of reactions thenceforward until the third
birthday differs only in degree, after which they begin to
diminish slowly. The effects of separation between the
seventh and thirty- sixth months are attenuated only by the
companionship of another and familiar child, a familiar
substitute caretaker, or a familiar setting.
Bowlby's (1960, 1973) review of literature on obser-
vations of young children's reactions to separation led
him to propose three phases of responses which are acquired
in developmental sequence: protest, despair, and detachment.
He contended that each phase refers to a set of central
issues raised by psychoanalytic theory, but handled in a
fragmented way rather than as a process. Bowlby linked
protest to the problem of separation anxiety, despair to
that of grief and mourning, and detachment to that of defense.
In the course of normal development all three phases are
traversed. The reuniting of the child with the lost object
re-establishes the attachment over time and initiates a
period of heightened dependency and acute anxiety in the
face of the possibility of another loss.
Bowlby's view, while useful in detailing and describ-
ing a developmental progression fails to appreciate the need
for a psychological theory which relates descriptions of
behavior in concrete situations to the complex social and
emotional matrix of the family. Bowlby's account makes
little allowance for the infinite variation in mother-
infant interaction. As importantly, Bowlby restricted his
formulation to the imposition of untoward separation ex-
periences, thereby placing the child in the passive and
reactive role in relation to separation. However, normal
development is interactional and must include separations
which are initiated by the child. Finally, the relationship
between Bowlby's behavioral configuration of responses to
internal structures which carry what is learned from one
setting to another is left unelaborated
.
The work of Mahler and her colleagues (Mahler, 1963,
1965, 1972; Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975) addressed the
latter two shortcomings of Bowlby's conceptualization.
Mahler's work joins the developmental study of separation
to object relations theory. Her extensive observations of
infants and toddlers inform a theory of the psychological
birth of the infant from the stage of symbiosis to individua
tion within the context of the mother-infant bond. A review
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of Mahler's work will ground the subsequent discussion of
object representation in a developmental model which appre-
ciates the subtle interplay of social and cognitive forces.
The psychological birth of the individual consists of
two complementary developments, separation and individuation.
Separation is the process of the child's emergence from a
symbiotic fusion with the mother. Individuation consists
of those accomplishments which signify the child's assump-
tion of her/his own individual characteristics. Together,
separation and individuation usher the child into a world
in which the attainment of object constancy and a unified
self-image reliably allow the child to retain or restore
her/his self-esteem. The first separation-individuation
process is the template through which later consolidations
of self and other representations are charted.
Psychological birth begins with an autistic, primi-
tively self-centered world in which "I" and "Not I" are
fused. Needs are met by what is experienced as omnipotent
action. The power of the self is unlimited for there is no
recognition of the "other." Gradually, through the develop-
ment of sensory and perceptual apparati, the infant's autis-
tic shell cracks and the perception of a dual unity betv.'een
mother and child sharpens. Progress from this symbiotic
unit toward separation and individuation occurs in four
subphases: differentiation, practicing, rapprochemient , and
the consolidation of individuality and the beginnings of
emotional object constancy.
In the differentiation subphase which begins at 4 to 1
months of age, the infant begins to extricate her/himself
from the symbiotic tie to mother via locomotion and the
expanding sensory and perceptual capacities. Manual, tac-
tile, and visual exploration of mother is at its height.
The seeking of distance of the infant from mother is accom.
panied by a variety of mechanisms designed to reassure the
infant of the successful return to mother who is now per-
ceived as a special caretaker. Visual checking back with
mother during this initial venture out of the all-envelopi
symbiosis helps to serve this function.
Elements of the practicing subphase begin to make
their appearance between 7 and 10 months of age and fully
assert themselves by 10 to 12 months of age. In this sub-
phase, the infant's distance from mother is significantly
increased. Checking back in with mother, refueling, is
sufficiently reassuring to permit repeated ventures into
the other- than-mother world. Critical to this achievement
is the infant's ability to stand upright and walk. A quan-
tum leap in the child's mastery and familiarity with the
world is marked by these events. Concomitantly, the child
narcissistic investment in her/his own faculties is at its
apex. The child's exhilaration with her/his discovery of
the ever-widening surroundings temporarily compensates for
the object loss which such explorations entail.
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Rapprochement, the third subphase, occasions a restim-
ulation of the child's interest in and concern for the
mother's whereabouts along with an enhanced sense of sep-
arateness. During this period from 18 or 21 months to the
third year of life, the need for and yet fear of closeness
is typically manifest by the toddler's refueling maneuvers-
shadowing and darting away. The push-pull quality of the
child's attachment, what Mahler calls ambitendency
, is
blatantly evident even before it reaches its most acute
phase of temper tantrums and demandingness
. The emergence
of the toddler's wooing of mother, currying her favor, and
otherwise attempting to give her pleasure is indication
that the fear of loss of the object has been replaced by
the fear of the loss of love. With the recognition that
her/his parents are independent, autonomous individuals
comes the painful realization of the illusory nature of the
child's belief in her/his omnipotence.
According to Mahler, the mother's "quiet availability"
and her ability to give the child the gentle push out of
the nest are crucial to a successful resolution of the
rapprochement subphase. When attained, the child has solid-
ified and differentiated internal representations of both
self and other. The use of the personal pronoun "I" which
first appears in this period signals such a unification
process. Thus, the achievement of emotional object con-
stancy is the heir of the third subphase. Mahler wrote,
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"In the state of object constancy, the love object will not
be rejected or exchanged for another if it can no longer
provide satisfactions; and in that state, the object is
still longed for, and not rejected (hated) as unsatisfac-
tory simply because it is absent" (p. 110).
Mahler observed the first indications of depressive
moods in children during the third subphase in response to
mother's absence. The mood was often accompanied by an
inability to engage in play for some length of time. Occa-
sionally children would seek a substitute to join with them
in a regressive symbiotic union. Mahler noted, too, that
during rapprochement a new constellation of responses which
involve activity and restlessness may arise in response to
missing mother. She suggested that these behaviors may
constitute early strategies to defend against sadness. As
the subphase progresses the toddler generally finds more
active coping strategies including turning to the other-
than-mother world of nearby adults and symbolic play.
Serious difficulty in resolving the rapprochement crisis
is signalled by escalating separation anxiety, impulse-laden
darting away, excessive shadowing, and sleep disturbances.
Mahler's observations clearly suggest that the ability to
manage depressive affect is dependent upon the successful
negotiation of the rapprochement subphase, a critical period
in the course of developing object constancy.
In the final subphase of the separation-individuation
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process, the lessons of the previous stages grow less fluid
and less reversible under stress. Emotional (libidinal)
object constancy and the consolidation of individuality
become progressively less vulnerable, a prerequisite for
the capacity to weather the storm of the phallic and Oedi-
pal eras.
Mahler's work lays the groundwork for a developmental
perspective of the impact of object loss which integrates
the cognitive development of the child within an object
relational framework. For the purposes of the present study,
three lines of development traced by Mahler through the first
several years of life are of critical importance. First,
Mahler anchored child development along a psychosocial
sequence of progressive separation and individuation. Paral-
lel to this sequence is the physical and cognitive maturation
of the child. Last, and perhaps most critically for the pre-
sent study, Mahler paralleled these two lines with the devel-
opment of increasingly differentiated and integrated self and
other internal representations. Mahler's investigations,
then, provide guideposts for the normal journey through the
separation-individuation process and suggest some pathologi-
cal deviations.
While Mahler's work may serve as a foundation for a
developmental model of depression, many vital issues remain
unclarified. Among them, the nature of the relationship
between cognitive development and object representation and
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its constancy is central. An integrated understanding of
mental representation £er se and libidinal representation
must reconcile both the developmental timetable for their
attainment and the proliferation of meanings associated with
object constancy. A second question which is raised, but
not answered by Mahler's studies is the role of later
development. Inasmuch as cognitive maturation is not
completed until well into adolescence, one wonders what role
subsequent stages play in the representation of the object
and in the capacity to bear loss and separation. Lastly,
the implications of deviations in the normal sequence for
later psychopathology are not fully explored by Mahler.
Each of these three questions will be discussed in turn.
Cognitive Development and Object Constancy
The nature of the interrelationship of cognitive devel-
opment and libidinal object representation is not well es-
tablished, due largely to independent evolution of cognitive
psychology and psychoanalytic investigations. Recently,
however, the task of integrating the two fields has attracted
attention and promises to make major contributions to an
empirically grounded object relations theory (Blatt, 1974;
Fraiberg, 1969; Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975; Schaffer,
1953)
.
One critical integration of the cognitive and object
relations literatures is that of the representation of inani-
mate objects versus libidinal objects. For the present pur-
poses, the work of Piaget and his colleagues, as discussed
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by Blatt (1974), is reviewed with respect to the acquisi-
tion of inanimate object permanence. Further, the rela-
tionship between a Piagetian developmental sequence and
psychoanalytic conceptions of the development of libidinal
object constancy are discussed. Ultim.ately, although dis-
parities in the developmental timetable emerge, m.uch sup-
port is offered for a positively correlated relationship
between the two processes.
Piaget (1937, 1945) studied the development of mental
representation in relation to inanimate objects through a
sequence of screened object tests presented to infants
during the first year and a half of life. He found an
orderly progression of stages from sensory-motor, perceptual,
intuitive, to operation, in which the representation of the
non-human object evolves toward greater generality and con-
stancy. Each new stage integrates previous learning and
extends representations along these dimensions. Representa-
tion is used by Piaget to denote the union of the signifier
and the signified. The process of accommodation yields
the signifier, an indicator of particular underlying cogni-
tive schemata, which is expressed in a form of imitation
varying according to developmental stage, but becoming
increasingly internalized. That which is signified is the
product of assimilation, and integrates present experience
of the object with earlier schemata, and invests it with
meaning. Representation is therefore a process in which
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assimilation and accommodation are interwoven so that the
relation between signifier and signified is increasingly
stable. In its most advanced form, representational thought
implies evocative recall; a memory image of the absent object.
At the outset, in the sensorimotor stage, the child
responds to the activity of objects and gradually separates
the object from its action. Initially, then, representa-
tions are immediate, direct, and have only minimal perman-
ence. Images are linked statically, like a cartoon in slow
motion. Although in this stage true representation is not
yet possible, certain action schemata are developed which
permit the child's recognition of the object insofar as
s/he is able to interact with the object now as in the past.
No evocation of the object in its absence is observed until
the second year of life. That is, tied to data from the
senses, signification is perceptual and thus undifferenti-
ated from the signified.
When the signified and the signifiers become both dif-
ferentiated and coordinated, true representation is said to
have begun. Early differentiations are assisted by imita-
tion and the mental images thereby formed. Gradually imi-
tation becomes less tied to perceptual features and more
symbolic. The shift in imitation is mirrored by a shifting
from action schemas to representation in thought.
Representational thought is superimposed upon sensori-
motor images as language is acquired by the child. In its
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earliest stage, from the appearance of language to A-^H
years, objects are simply signified by the image and some-
what idiosyncratic verbalization. The representations are
immediate and partial, having little constancy. Further,
the child has almost no access to images of anticipated
figures or situations, but rather only previously perceived
reproductive images.
Intuitive thought, according to Piaget, appears at 4-5
years of age. The stage is intermediary between the pre-
conceptual and operational stages and thus between the
imagistic and the conceptual level. Within the intuitive
stage the child generalizes beyond the idiosyncratic and
part image to representations which contain a whole con-
figuration.
The fourth developmental stage is divided by Piaget
into two subphases, concrete operations (age 7-8) and for-
mal operations (age 11-12). In the early stage, anticipa-
tory images develop and reproductive images may undergo
changes in position and form, that is, symbolic transforma-
tions may now occur. Representation grows less egocentric
and more abstracted. This "decentering" involves the
liberating of the representation from the context in which
it is embedded. The child acquires the ability to take a
point of view and distinguish her/his own from that of others.
With the entry into formal operations, the self becomes an
independent object—one among many objects which have
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enduring features, properties which remain consistent even
while the context changes. Full development of representa-
tion is indicated by the acquisition of the evocative memory
of objects and situations outside the perceptual field by
means of images, signs, thoughts, and symbols. Formal
operations is thus the last stage in successive steps toward
ever more stable and encompassing equilibrium. The final
stage of formal operations is not stabilized until adoles-
cence .
Hartmann (1952) was the first to use the term "object
constancy" in the psychoanalytic literature, referring to
a state in which drive neutralization was sufficient to
divorce object relations from a purely need-gratifying con-
text. Later, he compared it to Piaget's term "object con-
cept
Here I want to say a few words about another
aspect of the separation of self and object,
which also is a step toward constancy of the
latter. First, the infant does not distinguish
between the objects and his activities vis-a-vis
the objects. In the words of Piaget (1937), the
object is still nothing but a prolongation of
the child's activity. Later, in the course of
those processes that lead to a distinction of
object and self, the child also learns to which
activity this is directed. The earlier stage
may be correlated with magic action and prob-
ably represents a transitory step in ego (or,
rather, pre-ego) development, interposed between
simple discharge and true ego-directed and or-
ganized action . The later stage represents one
aspect of "ob j ectivation" which is an ego con-
tribution to the development of object rela-
tions and an essential element in the institu-
tion of the reality principle. Piaget's find-
ings agree rather well with the findings of
analysis, and it means, metapsychologically
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speaking, that from then on there is a differ-ence between the cathexis of an object-directed ego function and the cathexis of an
object representation." (Hartmann, 1953, p. 187)
Concurrently Anna Freud (19 52) elaborated the transition
from narcissistic to object libido on the basis of an abate-
ment of the drives. Under these circumstances attachment
to the nongratifying object can be retained. The infant is
gradually able to retain the cathexis in the absence of
need satisfactions for gradually lengthened periods of time
until the child is capable of maintaining libidinal cathexes
to the object during prolonged separations. In a 1960 essay
she defined object constancy as the maintenance of an inter-
nal image of a cathected person without regard to the actual
object's presence or absence.
Anna Freud, unlike Hartmann, used the term constancy,
not in its larger cognitive sense, but simply to describe
the libidinal attachment to the mother. She spoke of it
in relation to the child's cathexis to the object independent
of the object's need gratifying properties. The relationship
between Anna Freud's concept of constancy and its usage in
general psychology was clarified by her only to the extent
that she asserted that object constancy acquired in the
second half of the first year of life and following the
attainment of an independent mental representation.
Similar confusions in terminology are noted by Fraiberg
(1969) throughout her review of the concepts of libidinal
object constancy and mental representation. Jacobson (1964)
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and Alpert (1965) used the term object constancy colloqui-
ally, to mean the steadfastness of attachment. Frosch (1966),
even while invoking perceptual criteria of constancy in
time and space, denied its relation to the general psychol-
ogical usage of object constancy. Spitz (1966) referred to
a stable, consistent memory or image of mother in which
good and gratifying memory traces and bad and frustrating
ones are united in a single image. Spitz dated the
achievement of object constancy at eight months of age using
the criterion of stranger anxiety. Nagera's (1966) discus-
sion of object constancy placed its attainment between the
third or fourth month and the eighteenth month. He used
the term to mean the exclusive bond to the mother. Finally,
Mahler (1965) whose work has already been discussed in
another context, relied upon Hartmann's definition of object
constancy which took into account stable mental representa-
tion as well as libidinal attachment.
Fraiberg (1969) summarized the divergences in the use
of the concept of object constancy in an attempt to recon-
cile the range of age norms proposed for its attainment.
She observed,
This range ... extended from six months of
age to twenty- five months. The apparent
discrepancy seems to be the result of dif-
ferences in definition. The writers who
ascribe the beginnings of object constancy
to the middle of the first year are using
"constancy" only in the sense of attach-
ment to the love object. The writers who
give a range from eight months to eighteen
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months of age are adding some form ofmental representation to the criteria forlibidinal cathexis of the object; t^osewho place object constancy at eighteenmonths appear to be following Piage^-S
criteria for mental representation andobject concept. The one writer (Mahler)
P^^^^^ constancy at twenty-fivemonths was using a still more restrictive
criteria on the libidinal-cognitive scale,m which mental representation of the
mother had attained a higher level of
stability. (p. 19)
Fraiberg suggested that the criterion of the establishment
of evocative memory be used to delineate object constancy.
She noted that libidinal attachment to mother, stranger
anxiety, and separation anxiety, which occur by the end of
the first year, demand no more than highly selective and
differentiated recognition memory. Placing these events
along a continuum of relative distance from drive or need
states, the development of mental images proceeds from a
correspondence with the stimulus, to that of sign (recogni-
tion), to evocation in the absence of a sign. Her formula-
tion aligns the psychoanalytic conception of libidinal object
constancy with that of Piaget's evocative memory of inanimate ob-
jects at eighteen months of age.
Burgner and Edgcumbe (1972) proposed the term "capacity
for constant relationships" in order to differentiate object
constancy from perceptual constancy. The term implied the
ability to maintain libidinal investment in a specific
object, regardless of its presence or absence, to recognize
and tolerate conflicting feelings toward the object, to focus
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feelings on a particular object, and to value the object
for features unrelated to need gratification.
Blatfs (1974) integration of cognitive and psycho-
analytic frameworks is the most comprehensive. He purported
that object representations initially grow out of repeated
experiences of frustration and gratification with a consis-
tent and need-gratifying object. Gradually, representations
become more accurate, complex, differentiated, integrated,
and stable as the parent-child interaction becomes more
differentiated. Thus, object representations and the pro-
gression through the developmental sequence depend upon the
nature of object relationships. Thus, Blatt preserved the
importance of the affective and interactional components
throughout his cognitive schema.
Blatt demarcated four levels of representation pre-
ceded by a pre-representational, pre-objectal stage. From
this first stage in which the infant is unable to distin-
guish her/his pleasurable feelings from the pleasure-giving
object, the infant progressively recognizes that gratifica-
tion is derived from a specific source, the discernment of
which becomes a source of pleasure apart from the pleasure
itself. This transition marks the first level of represen-
tation, the sensorimotor level of representation. Within
it, the object remains largely undifferentiated and is
libidinally invested almost exclusively in terms of its
need gratifying function. The object is experienced as its
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activities, and its representation is the mental equiva-
lent of the action pattern. The object remains embedded
in its context and has little meaning or existence apart
from its capacity to provide comfort and soothe the infant.
The infant's ability to search for the object after its
visible appearance and displacement, later, following dis-
placement unobserved by the infant and, finally, by sen-
sorimotoric imitations of the object are characteristic
of the first level of representation.
The second level identified by Blatt is that of per-
ceptual object representation. The child acquires the
capacity to recognize the object regardless of variations
in the circumstances in which it is encountered and as an
entity in its own right having a variety of functions and
actions. A constant libidinal cathexis is maintained
autonomously from gratification patterns. Attempts to imi-
tate the object and its recognition across a variety of
contexts is indicative of the achievement of perceptual
object representation. The representation is a 'concrete,
literal, fixed, perceptual totality' which is not broken
down into separate components" (p. 144) . Evocative recall
remains unavailable to the child in the second stage of
representation and contradictory experiences with the object
may be confusing. Nonetheless, the child's perception of
the object is consolidated.
The iconic phase of object representation is a transi-
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tional phase culminating in conceptual representations.
Iconic representation is based on a concrete sign which is
relatively specific, concrete, and manifests part i.roper-
ties, functions, and interests of the object. The repre-
sentation may show some appreciation for attributes which
are internal, but are principally linked to particular
manifest aspects which become, however, progressively more
subtle. Iconic representation is denotative, depictive,
concrete, fragmented, and overstated, and contains contra-
diction and ambivalence.
As part properties become increasingly articulated
and differentiated, they are gradually used as symbols of
increasing abstraction. Imitation also 'becomes less
grounded in manifest perceptual features like mannerisms
and more symbolic and internal. Apparent contraditions
between part properties are slowly reconciled and the parts
reintegrated in a representation of the whole object. These
whole object representations grow more diverse, integrated,
conceptual, and abstract with development. The transition
to the fourth level, the conceptual level of representation,
indicates the capacity to form representations based on
inner state or internal structure. They are independent
of "nonreflective perception of manifest aspects of the
object" (p. 145) . Conceptual representations denote a fully
independent entity with specific, enduring features, func-
tions, values, and feelings which are not consistently tied
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to any immediate circumstance or relationship. m this final
level of object representation, stability and continuity of
representations and evocative recall is achieved and antici-
patory representation is possible. Conceptual-symbolic
representation occurs during the latter stages of the
separation-individuation process when the Oedipal crisis is
resolved, but is not fully attained until infantile and
Oedipal identification are finally relinquished in adolescence.
Blatt concluded.
With development, object representations
become increasingly differentiated, integ-
rated, and accurate. They proceed from
amorphous, global representations, to a
somewhat differentiated emphasis on part
properties, to representations which are
highly articulated and integrated, and
closely correspond to reality. Represen-
tations can range from images of objects
immediately present in the perceptual field
to symbolic evocation of absent realities.
Earlier forms of representation are based
more on action sequences associated with
need gratification, intermediate forms are
based on specific perceptual features, and
the higher forms of object representation
are more symbolic and conceptual. (p. 142)
Using this schema, Blatt proceeded to integrate his develop-
mental model of object representation and responses to ob-
ject loss associated with two types of depression, anaclitic
and intro jective
.
He argued that not only is the predis-
position to depression determined by a failure to establish
adequate levels of object representation, but also that the
level at which the object is represented is related to the
type of depression.
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According to Blatt, in anaclitic depression, the object
is represented at a sensorimotor level, requiring direct,
physical, sensory-gratifying contact to maintain the repre-
sentation. Since the object is then cathected almost entire-
ly in relation to its need-gratifying function and is synon-
ymous with its need-gratifying activities, its loss threatens
physical annihilation and stimulates a search for a direct
and immediate replacement. In the absence of a substitute
or the reappearance of the object, the need to deny the loss
is potent.
By contrast, the intro jectively depressed individual
represents the object at the perceptual and iconic levels,
that is, fragmented, isolated, static, and ambivalent
representations having little resolution of the contradic-
tions between separate images or part properties. It is
not the loss of the object per se which is feared, but
rather, the loss of love, acceptance, and approval offered
by the object. In anticipation of loss, the individual
strives for perfection and outstanding achievement which
will forestall the loss of love. Blatt viewed constant
self-criticism, guilt, and overstated representations of
part properties of the object as means of maintaining con-
tact with the object.
The capacity to resolve the loss of the object without
prolonged or severe depression requires a conceptual level
of representation in which an integration of contradictory
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and ambivalently perceived part properties and attributes
has been accomplished. The representations, based as they
are on abstracted and enduring inner form and structure of
the object, have continuity. m Blatfs words, "they
transcend time and are independent of the physical proper-
ties or presence of the object" (p. 150). This allows the
full acceptance that the object is no longer physically
present, but continues to have meaning contained in a con-
solidated, consistent, nonambivalent
,
symbolic representa-
tion of the object.
Blatfs approach permits the simultaneous and parallel
consideration of cognitive development, the development of
object representation, responses to object loss, and type
of depression. His work integrates both the cross-
sectional literature on depressive typologies and develop-
mental literature on loss as well as the cognitive and psy-
choanalytic literatures on representation. Blatt's formula-
tion thus represents the most advanced statement of a
developmental model of object relations and loss.
While Blatt's work is the most comprehensive theoreti-
cal position, several cogent questions are not addressed.
Inasmuch as epidemiological studies indicate that object
loss is related to, but is nonspecific to clinical depres-
sion, what mediates the relationship between loss and its
various psychopathological concomittants? If in fact
Blatt's hypothesized relationship between the level of object
representation and ways of handling object loss is valid,
then its predictive power must transcend diagnostic cate-
gories, except insofar as they correspond to developmental
stages in the capacity to bear loss. Further, Blatfs
model implies (but does not provide empirical conf irm.ation)
that the structure rather than the content alone of repre-
sentations differentiates the severity of symptom formation
Thus, the way in which content, such as aggression toward
the lost object, is organized— sensorimotorically
, iconic-
ally, or conceptually—presumably determines the nature of
coping strategies and defenses against loss should restitu-
tive efforts fail. With reference to early developmental
stages or pathological fixation points, presumably then, a
propensity toward desperate object-seeking and acting-out
and denial of loss indicates a sensorimotor level of
representation whereas imitation along the perceptual
dimension and compulsivity is indicative of a perceptual
level of representation, and overdriven strivings, obses-
sive ruminations, and guilt-laden preoccupations is sugges-
tive of an iconic level of representation. The correspon-
dence between early developmental levels of representation
and the capacity to bear object loss and later pathological
responses to loss is not yet empirically established.
To conclude the second section, three major areas and
their interrelationship were investigated. Demographic
studies showed the significance of object loss-related
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events early and recent, to depression and other psychiat-
ric syndromes. They do not in themselves reveal, however,
factors which mediate individual differences in the vul-
nerability to particular pathological syndromes. a thor-
ough understanding of the role of loss and separation in
normal development was thought to provide some markers for
assessing pathological resolutions which are exaggerations
and/or prolongations of normative responses. The present
author proposed, in accordance with considerable theoretical
and empirical foundations, that the capacity to bear loss
is related to cognitive maturation, more specifically,
cognitive developments which contribute increasingly stable,
differentiated, articulated, and integrated object repre-
sentation.
In the next section, the special relevance of the
topics under investigation for adolescence is discussed.
Particular attention is paid once again to the depressive
syndrome as a potential framework for understanding the
variations in object loss/separation-related phenomena.
Attention is also paid to the more unique aspects of the
adolescent phenomena as well as its place in a larger
developmental schema.
Developmental Models of Depression
The Adolescent Case
In earlier sections, a review of major psychodynamic
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theories of depression revealed the centrality of object
loss in the etiology and precipitation of depression.
However, research on the role of object loss in psychiat-
ric disorders does not support a direct causal link between
early or recent object losses and depression. Thus, while
a relationship between them exists, depression is not
always preceded by object loss, nor is object loss always
followed by depression. Object loss does appear to be
potent psychological factor evoking a variety of symptom
complexes, including but not limited to depression.
Much of the second section was devoted to the explora-
tion of the cognitive mediation of responses to object loss.
Mahler, Pine, and Bergman (1975), Schaffer (1958), Bowlby
(1973), and others showed that the manner in which object
loss is managed undergoes a normative developmental progres-
sion and has expectable pathognomonic variations. Both
Mahler and Schaffer suggested that the capacity to bear
object loss is ultimately intertwined with cognitive
maturation, particularly the development of stable, dif-
ferentiated, and integrated object representations. With
a clear and theoretically well-grounded model of the devel-
opment of object representation provided by Blatt (1974)
,
the stage is set to explore the enduring impact of early
cognitive developmental difficulties on the level at which
later losses or separation are resolved.
Adolescence is a particularly appropriate developmental
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era on which to focus the study of object loss and representa-
tion, for it is a time when the issues of separation and
individuation are again in the forefront as developmental
tasks. Normally, the most advanced stage of cognitive
development is attained. The soundness of earlier resolu-
tions are tested in a larger and extra-familial psychosocial
arena and under the more powerful press of adolescent
libidinal and aggressive drives. The conceptual links
between loss in early development and the centrality of
separation for adolescence have been noted by many.
Hall (1970), who created the modern concept of adoles-
cence, described the stage as a second birth. Several
influential psychological theorists have underscored the
renewed possibilities for personality growth in adolescence
(Erikson, 1968; Fenichel, 1945; Freud, 1936; Hartmann, Kris,
& Loewenstein, 1946). Erikson (1963) put forth perhaps the
most widely accepted conceptualization of adolescence, one
which poses an "identity crisis" as the central conflict
for the maturing individual. Erikson observed.
But in puberty and adolescence all sameness
and continuities relied on earlier are more
or less questioned again... The growing and
developing youths, faced with the psychol-
ogical revolution within them, and with
tangible adult tasks ahead of them are now
primarily concerned with what they appear to
be in the eyes of others as compared with
what they feel they are... In their search
for a new sense of continuity and sameness,
adolescents have to refight many of the bat-
tles of earlier years, even though to do so
they must artificially appoint perfectly
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well-meaning people to play the role ofadversaries; and they are ever ready toinstall lasting idols and ideals as guard-ians of a final identity. (p. 261)
Bios (1962), whose study of adolescence forms the core
of an ego psychological approach, described adolescence as
the second separation-individuation phase. He remarked,
"the adolescent's slow severence of the emotional ties to
his family, his fearful or exhilarated entrance into the
new life which beckons him, these experiences are among
the profoundest in human existence" (p. 12). Bios, like
Erikson, understood adolescence as a turning point in the
formation of identity, that process being intimately asso-
ciated with the adolescent's hatching from the family into
the wider adult world. The necessity to somehow decisively
separate from the emotional matrix of the family, requires
a sense of self and others which endures tumult, preserves
a belief in one's competence, and assures the adolescent
of some future harbor. Commenting on Anderson's description
of an adolescent leaving home. Bios wrote,
George's mourning is like a symbol for
the deep losses which adolescence entails.
Alone and surrounded by man's eternal fear
of abandonment and panic, the familiar and
life-old need for human closeness awakens;
love and understanding are expected to
rekindle the trust in life, to blow away
the fear of isolation and death. The
limitless future of childhood shrinks to
realistic proportions, to one of limited
chances and goals, but by the same token,
the mastery of time and space and the
conquest of helplessness afford a hitherto
unknown promise of self-realization. This
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is the human condition of adolescence
which the poet has laid bare. (pp. 13-14)
In light of such formulations of adolescent develop-
mental tasks, the paucity of literature on depression and
loss in adolescence is puzzling. Until recently, the
incidence of depression during this stage was thought to
be negligible, particularly by contrast with either schizo-
phrenia or character disordered behavior. A review of more
current research revealed that the reported clinical fre-
quency of depression among adolescents varies widely.
Frommer (1968), in a study of an English clinic population,
reported that at least one quarter of the children and
adolescents were depressed. On the other hand, Schachter
(1971) claimed that depression was rarely diagnosed among
the 30,000 children and adolescents in his Marseilles clinic.
While Masterson (1967) found that 40% of an out-patient
adolescent population v/ere symptomatically depressed, only
4.5% of all teenagers in a Turkish clinic were diagnosed
depressed according to a study by Poluan and Cebiroglu
(1972) . Unsurprisingly, then, Kramer (1969) reported that
the age of onset of depression varies widely by nation.
Unfortunately, the sources of these disparate findings are
not clear, but must in part be attributable to differential
diagnostic criteria and age-related biases.
One major approach to reconciling current theoretical
formulations of adolescence, focusing on loss and separa-
tion, and earlier assumptions regarding the low incidence
of depressive syndromes during adolescence centers on the
"normality of depression of the age group. its ubiquity
makes the clinical syndrome difficult to distinguish from
the typical course through adolescence. Anna Freud (1958),
for example, considered all adolescents to be in a state
of mourning for the lost simplicity of childhood. Benedek
(1975) attributed a "healthy" depression to adolescence as
a function of the renewed strength of sexual drives in the
face of social constraints on its expression. She noted
that such a conflict was exacerbated by current trends
which extended adolescence through the third decade of
life. Anthony (1970) also believed depression to be a
common adolescent experience. Unwin (1970) discussed the
adolescent years as time in which dreams, hopes, fantasies,
and fears meet the test of reality, naturally precipitating
sadness and mourning. Root (1957) referred to mourning as
itself an important psychological task of adolescence.
Easson (1977) observed that adolescents may be unwilling
to acknowledge depression for fear of being viewed by
others as overly dependent or puerile. Often, with adoles-
cents, only in retrospect is the degree of depression and
the severity of precipitating factors and symptoms appre-
ciated (Gallemore & Wilson, 1972)
.
Further, several researchers (Cytryn & McKnew, 1972;
Krakowski, 1970; Lesse, 1974; Lidz, Lidz, & Rubenstein,
1971; Malmquist, 1971; Sperling, 1959; Toolan, 1962) contend
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that depression is expressed differently at different
developmental eras. They attribute the relatively low
incidence of adolescent depression to the inappropriate
application of adult diagnostic criteria. in general, the
term "depressive equivalents" is used to refer to an array
of symptoms or syndromes which are said to mask depression
in adolescence. Denial, reaction formation, action equi-
valents, aggressive delinquency, drug abuse, and anorexia
nervosa or other somatic complaints are chief among the
hypothesized masking agents.
Anthony (1970) identified two types of adolescent
depression distinguishable primarily by the parts of psycho-
sexual fixation. In the first type, pathology is largely
pre-Oedipal in nature, characterized by a symbiotic tie with
the omnipotent, need-satisfying mother. With regard to
object relations, no clear delineation of self and other
is made and object choice is predominantly narcissistic.
On the other hand, the second type of depression is more
Oedipally determined. Guilt and moral masochism are widely
evidenced. Hostility, generated by disappointments in the
idealized parents is turned against the self.
Malmquist (1971) developed a classification schema for
childhood and adolescent depressions. Regarding the latter,
he proposed seven basic types: mood lability as a develop-
mental process, reactive to current loss, unresolved mourn-
ing from current losses, earlier losses currently being
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dealt with by the ego, acting-out depressions, schizophrenia
with prominant affective components, and continuations of
childhood and latency depressions. Malmquisfs model uses
the diagnostic category of depression largely as a descrip-
tive category with depressive mood being the central, com-
mon feature.
According to Malmquist depressed adolescents show
several core features. Mixed symptomatology is common. At
times, the array of symptoms and mood lability may have a
cyclothymic quality. Adolescent depression often has unre-
solved dependency conflicts as central. Malmquist noted
active superego conflicts indicative of a pervasive sense
of self dissatisfaction. The depressed adolescent tends
to act out as a defense against despair and helplessness.
The insatiable seeking of affection is frequently observed.
Confusions in identification or the choice of, in Erikson's
terms, a "negative identity" and the heightened self-
condemnation are likely elements of adolescent depressions.
Most promising, however, among the attempts to grapple
with the issue of adolescent depression are a handful of
developmental models of depression. They have several advan-
tages over other approaches. A developmental model of adol-
escent depression locates the phenomenon in relation to the
larger body of literature on depression by making integral
links with the more classic forms observed in children and
adults. A developmental approach allows for a contrast with
normal development and the identification of the more cru-
cial differentiating factors in the etiology of depressive
reactions. Questions regarding the shifting meanings of
object loss, needs which derive from loss, and the means
of resolving it across developmental eras may be systemati-
cally assessed. In short, a developmental model most fully
contains the potential to integrate causal and precipitating
factors, to integrate multiple levels of personality cross-
sectionally, to provide a framework for a longitudinal study,
to formulate a process of mourning, and to develop guide-
posts for a treatment process. Both Feinstein (1975) and
Bemporad and Wilson (19 78) have m.ade significant contribu-
tions toward such a model. After summarizing their work,
an attempt will be made to draw together and parallel the
developmental perspectives of object loss and separation,
object representation, and depression.
Feinstein (1975) elaborated theoretical links between
developmental stages and the capacity to resolve object
losses. He viewed depressive reactions as a normal method
by which individuals integrate the cognitive and affective
recognition of loss. Object loss is seen as precipitating
an ego state of helplessness and vulnerability to feelings
of abandonment and fears of annihilation- Loss therefore
demands the immediate reintegration of ego structures.
Central to Feinstein 's framework, the nature of adaptive
response of the ego to object loss or separation is a
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function of the developmental phase of the individual. The
level is thus dually determined by the developmental phase
and the level of ego development which, in normal develop-
ment, are roughly equivalent. Pathological responses to
loss are distinguished from normal responses by their fail-
ure to re-establish equilibrium after an initially regres-
sive period.
Feinstein identified five stages of mourning, each of
which corresponds to a developmental era in which certain
loss-related capacities are acquired. The first stage,
that of denial, corresponds to the presymbiotic stage of
the early months of infancy. The infant has not yet
developed the intense human bond that will lead to a higher
capacity for a relationship. The recognition of object is
delayed, the infant continues to behave as though the object
is still there. In normal adult reactions to bereavement,
denial is manifest by such common comments as, "I can't
believe he's gone," or "No it's not true!" The persistence
of denial marks a pathological reaction which serves to
ward off terrifying emotional consequences of the loss.
They may reach delusional proportions or manic extremes.
Feinstein' s second stage, depression, is rooted in
the symbiotic phase of development. The perception of loss
by the symbiotic child initiates what Feinstein referred to
as "the most treacherous reaction the ego experiences,"
feelings of loneliness, fears of abandonment, and a
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certainty of annihilation in the absence of well-developed
restitutive mechanisms. The infant depends upon the
rapid restoration of a mothering figure to forestall the
emergence of pathological coping mechanisms. m the sym-
biotic child these progress from protest, to despair, and
finally to detachment which may culminate in death (Spitz &
Wolfe, 1946). A regression to the depression stage may
involve acting-out, aggression against the self, guilt
reactions, agitated states, suicide attempts, affective
sado-masochistic reaction, and repression. These are
referred to by Feinstein as equivalents of anaclitic
defenses
.
Disruption of the anaclitic level, according to Fein-
stein, later results in the severely limited capacity to
weather losses. Regressions are rapid owing to the fragil-
ity of self-esteem. Clinging dependency and a reliance on
affective cues are used to ward off losses.
The separation-individuation is the third stage in
Feinstein 's schema. It refers to a stage up to age 3 to 4
in which ego mechanisms, principally the establishment of
object constancy, are brought into the service of resolving
losses. The retention in memory of the lost object reas-
sures the depressed ego of its survival. Although Fein-
stein left it implicit, his observations link the inadequate
resolution of the separation-individuation stage, borderline
personality organization, and behavioral manifestations of
Lons in
splitting. The latter included remarkable fluctuati,
mood, intense dependency conflicts, insatiable seeking of
affection, confusion in identification, and identity dif-
fusion.
Those whose major fixation lies within the separation-
individuation stage lack stable introjects with which to
reaffirm their own intactness. Feinstein reported that
intense symbiotic relationships with mother are often found
frequently alongside great hostility. Such individuals are
typically cognizant of their dilemma— the need yet the
inability to free themselves of the bond. Hypochondrical
trends, psychosomatic disorder, acting-out, and extreme
mood swings between elation and despair are commonly seen.
In the fourth stage, achievements of the Oedipal era
and latency are brought to bear upon the response to object
loss. Feinstein discussed this fourth stage of mourning,
rage toward the lost object, as a consequence of the aware-
ness of the interference with the important relationship
and the anticipation of the necessity to mourn. Secondarily,
the latency age child is mature enough to confront the
reality of the meaning of death. The rage is the result
of the ego's unavoidable perception of the consequences of
loss for the self. The incompleteness of superego develop-
ment at this stage may make one's acceptance of the angry
impulses difficult. The primary tasks for the latency age
child or fourth stage of the mourning process are the active
and concrete operations in relation to the perception of
loss.
Individuals haunted by unresolved Oedipal or latency
issues tend to invoke narcissistic defenses including a
resurgence of feelings of omnipotence and the devaluation
of authority figures. The hostility normally directed at
the lost object is often misdirected at the surviving
parent or the self, and thus produces either a heightened
contentiousness toward authority figures or a moral masochism
In Feinstein's final stage of mourning, the capacity
to fully convert the external relationship to an introject
and thereby return to homeostasis is attained. This recon-
stitution stage is the culmination of the work of adoles-
cence. As defined by Feinstein, this work is the reworking
of the drives, the recapitulation of identifications,
resolution of dependency, and the synthesis of an independent
character structure. Prior to these accomplishments, the
mourning process cannot be completed, and for this reason
the adolescent ego—v/ith early defense mechanisms, but
lacking restitutive defenses is vulnerable and often over-
come by demands. Frequently the adolescent, even one who
has successfully negotiated previous stages, may be left
confused, ambivalent, and fearful of diffusion of the ego
in the face of object loss or separation.
Feinstein 's model satisfies the criteria for a develop-
mental model of the capacity to bear object loss in that
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each stage of development ushers in new and more advanced
ego mechanisms through which the loss may be managed.
Further, depressive reactions later in life are understood
as fixations along a developmental sequence of reactions to
loss
.
Unfortunately, Feinstein failed to take fully into
account the developmental literature, particularly Mahler's
observations, which contradict his proposed sequence.
Depression, for example, is placed by Feinstein in the
second or symbiotic stage of development, associating it
with the experience of fragmentation. Depressive affect
and the establishment of sufficient levels of individuation
and object constancy to retain the libidinally invested
object representation in its absence are not observed by
Mahler, however, until the rapprochement subphase. Fein-
stein's assignment of depression to the symbiotic stage is
inconsistent not only with empirical data, but also with
theoretical formulations of depression which link it
phenomenologically to an empty, depleted, and isolated, but
intact self rather than a fragmenting, deteriorating experi-
ence of self associated with schizophrenia (Jacobson, 1953;
Benedek, 1975). Similar difficulties emerge with Feinstein's
assumption that rage at the lost object is not a component
of the child's mourning process until the Oedipal or latency
phase. Observations of infants separated from mother con-
firm active protest and hostility toward substitute care-
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takers at age 7 months. Feinstein appears to have confused
what are perhaps conflicts about the expression of rage
which occur in relation to the Oedipal stage with the rage-
ful affect which is in evidence much before.
Feinstein-
s focus on ego mechanisms and defenses short-
changes an object relational understanding. Thus, although
he does attempt to trace the parallel development of depres-
sive reactions and the establishment of object constancy,
the implications are stated largely in terms of the intact-
ness of the ego per se and only from an individualistic
perspective. Feinstein noted, but did not elaborate
the relationship between the intact ego, affects, defenses,
and subsequent object relationships.
Bemporad and Wilson (1978) avoided most of Feinstein 's
pitfalls in their recent work on a developmental approach
to depression. They conceptualized depression as a primary
affect having certain particular cognitive prerequisites;
an awareness of the continuity in time, the idea of res-
ponsibility for one's behavior, and a characterological
defensive structure. These prerequisites are presumed to
be significantly related to both the internalization and
generalization of experiences which differentiate depression
from momentary and externally stimulated dysphoric moods.
Further, consistent with Beck (1976), they grant a central
precipitating role to object loss only insofar as the loss
influences the individual's beliefs about her/himself.
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events which disrupt a "needed sense of self." pinally,
they contrast infantile, childhood, and adolescent deprls-
sive syndromes with the adult clinical depression, ignoring
then normal age-appropriate responses to depressxon-inducing
events, while these assumptions run counter to those of
the present author, Bemporad and Wilson have suggested a
viable developmental progression of the capacity to experi-
ence depression, one which is rooted in cognitive albeit
a non-object relational developmental framework.
Bemporad and Wilson (1978) divided early development
into five stages from infancy to adolescence, each with
its own age-appropriate forms of depression. in infancy,
none of the prerequisites of a depressive clinical syndrome
are present. Withdrawal, apathy, and detachment observed
by Spitz (1946) and others in infants separated from
mother is attributed to a basic psychobiological reaction
to deprivation, a turning away from an ungratifying reality.
Early childhood brings with it active mastery efforts,
exploration, and self-assertion. Children in whom these
developments are frustrated may show a constrictedness of
autonomous action, overcontrolled pattern of affectivity,
and difficulties in separation. Whining, clinging, phobias,
and hypochondriacal trends may be manifest along with the
pseudomature posture. Bemporad and Wilson maintained that
these reactions prefigure inhibited defensive patterns which
serve to assure security over against new learning.
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More prolonged periods of sadness become evident in
middle childhood. They may be responses to chronic frus-
trations, deprivation, disappointment, or depreciation by
others. Prolonged dysphoria in middle childhood is dis-
tinguished from depression, however, the former being tied
to real and undistorted external events. Moods remain
relatively transitory and responses to environmental changes,
and a self-deprecatory posture is not sustained.
Bemporad and Wilson assigned the emergence of bona fide
clinical depression to the period of late childhood. Sig-
nificant cognitive advances, made in the transition from
middle to late childhood, allow for the inappropriate
extension of depressive symptoms. Notably, the child is
capable of feeling a sense of responsibility toward others
and is thereby susceptible to guilt. Further, a continuity
of self-representation, and therefore, too, of its negative
components, is attained. There is an expansion of the
child's ability to make causal and inferential links beyond
the immediate and observable level. Self-evaluative skill
acquired in late childhood contributes to feelings of weak-
ness and shame. In sum., internalization and the ability to
generalize from experiences are now sufficiently advanced
to justify the designation of depression.
Depressions in late childhood remain distinct from
the adult form. Bemporad and Wilson particularly noted
the absence of hopelessness and despair among depressed
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children as compared to adults. The projection of the self
into the future is, as yet, limited in this stage. Thus,
the depressed child, unlike her/his adult counterpart, does
not dread the future, fearing eternal depression.
Depressions which are truly equivalent to the adult
version become apparent in adolescence. First, the adoles-
cent's hyperbolic self-perceptions or "cognitive egocentrism"
may exaggerate feelings of worthlessness or inefficacy. with
a fully developed future orientation, but without the matur-
ity and knowledge to modulate emotional expression, actions
may be seen as irrevocably damaging. This factor contributes
to an overwhelming sense of urgency and despair which can
stimulate suicidal thoughts and actions. Bemporad and
Wilson nicely summarized the developmental dilemma of the
depressed adolescent:
Adolescents who become clinically depressed
are often those who, because of a lack of
confidence in their autonomous ability to
derive pleasure from extrafamilial activities
or relationships, do not venture away from
their secure, if tyrannical relationship with
parental figures. They find that living out
parental ideals is devoid of meaning for them
yet, at the same time, they are afraid to
live independently of these ideals, since
this would be tantamount to betraying the
parents and in their fantasies result in a
terrible state of aloneness and isolation,
(p. 347)
In Bemporad and Wilson's view each stage of development
adds certain characteristics to the experience of sadness
which culminate in the ability to experience depression.
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They link this maturational process to cognitive develop-
ment generally, but unfortunately do not elaborate the
details of the transitions between stages, nor do they take
up certain cogent clinical issues. With respect to the
latter, the relationship between the particular cognitive
variables of temporal orientation, responsibility, and
character defenses to object relations is not consistently
explored. Significantly, too, Bemporad and Wilson concerned
themselves only with age-appropriate depressive-like experi-
ences of childhood and adolescence. Fixations or regres-
sions to earlier developmental levels pose a host of other
complexities which remain unaccounted for in their formula-
tion. They do not grapple with a delineation of situational
or dynamic functions which precipitate depression. Finally,
no attempt is made to draw together cognitive maturation
and the capacity to recover from dysphoria. Many questions
remain unanswered regarding the differentiation of normal
and pathological age-specific depressive reactions. The
factors mediating such a differentiation between individuals
are also not addressed.
Comparing Feinstein's approach to Bemporad and Wilson's,
in both theories normality of reactions to potentially
depression-inducing experiences such as loss is defined
both by age-specific criteria for loss reactions and its
chronicity. Feinstein's framework, already shown to be
flawed in relation to Mahler's observations of children,
matches the intentions of the present author to mesh the
mourning process with developmental levels. Bemporad and
Wilson's, on the other hand, better reflects the child
developmental data, but uses chronological rather than
conceptually and psychologically meaningful stages of
development. An integration of the two approaches and
Mahler's stages of the senaration-individuation process
may yield a more viable developmental model.
In summary, a focus on the role of loss and separa-
tion in adolescence leaves no doubt as to its special
significance in shaping this developmental era. Yet, given
the prototypical etiological role of object loss and separa
tion in depression, studies of depressed adolescents are
few. A review of the literature revealed that both the
ubiquity of the phenomena and the highly variable character
ascribed to it present many theoretical difficulties; the
differentiation of normal and pathological states, the rela
tionship between regressive versus adolescent fixation
phenomena, and the larger question of what factors mediate
individual differences in the impact of losses and separa-
tions. For these reasons, a developmental approach serves
as the most viable starting point, for it places both
adolescence and depression in a developmental context.
Thus, adolescence can be appreciated for its contribution
to an on-going and complexly-determined course of develop-
t and for its unique properties. Depression can bemen
understood in relation to normative development and its
unique constellation, if any, of depression-inducing factors
in development. Further, a more theoretically sound nosology
of depression can derive from a developmental approach.
Although no comprehensive developmental theory currently
exists, the combined developmental literatures on separa-
tion and depression point consistently to a normative
sequence of mourning reactions. These may be used to
identify the origin of certain normative and pathological
adolescent as well as adult patterns of object loss-related
reactions. While it is clear that such complex configura-
tions will be complexly mediated, object representation
provides a strong theoretical basis from which to work. In
short, the present investigation, to be described in Chap-
ter II, explores from a developmental perspective the
nature of the relationship between the development of
object representation (and other factors) and the experience
of early and recent object losses or separations.
A Proposed Developmental Model of Depression
On the basis of the theoretical and empirical literature
reviewed, a developmental model of depression is proposed
below. The model attempts to identify psychologically
meaningful stages in the development of the capacity to
bear object loss. The stages are derived from normative
developmental progressions in the manner by which separations
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or losses are managed (Bemporad & Wilson, 1978; Mahler, Pine
& Bergman, 1975). m theory, then, the model assumes that:
the capacity to bear loss is developmentally acquired, the
topography of the management of separations and losses under-
goes qualitative shifts which parallel qualitative advances
in physiological and cognitive maturation, earlier stages are
subsumed by later stages, and progression from one stage to
the next requires at least minimal mastery of the preceding
stages. Further, reactions to losses will tend to recapitu-
late in some form the developmental sequence. The most mani-
fest features of one's attempts to manage such experiences is
assumed to reflect the individual's predominant level.
Each of the seven levels or stages are described along
five dimensions; the subjective definition of that which is
absent, as well as the behavioral, cognitive, affective, and
defensive components of handling the distress. Either pro-
longation or exaggeration of age-appropriate or age-
inappropriate responses are understood as pathological
and pathological responses to loss are presumed to bear
a relationship to difficulties encountered in the current
or previous stages of development. An overview of the se-
quence reveals that with development the management of
the distress of loss or separation proceeds from a defini-
tion of the loss as equivalent to the need gratifying func-
tion the object serves to a complex, abstracted, symbolic
conception which focuses primarily on the significance of
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the object's love, approval, or esteem. Behaviorally
, as
one advances through the stages the distress is coped with
decreasingly through action and increasingly through idea-
tion. Cognitively, more advanced stages bring greater
focus on self-esteem, guilt, and despair, and a future
orientation which allows for more extended mourning
Affectively, early stages are dominated by feelings of
helplessness and rage while sadness is predominant in later
stages. Defensive preference proceeds from attempts to
manipulate the external reality (denial, projection, acting
out) to internal strategies (internalization of the lost
object)
.
The stages of distress management in response to
loss or separation are as follows:
I- Presymbolic/Symbolic
. The object is
defined as equivalent to the need-
gratifying functions it serves for the
individual. Thus, initially, in its
absence, the individual continues to
behave as though nothing has changed.
As needs mount, substitutes for the
gratifications the object provided
are sought in a diffuse non-goal
directed fashion. Cognitively, bewil-
derment, confusion, and uncertainty
predominate. The physical presence of
the object is required to reassure the
individual of the continued existence
of a relationship. Affectively, in
the object's absence apathy, blandness,
and withdrawal are evident. Defensive-
ly, denial is central.
II. Differentiation . The object remains
defined by the need-gratifying activi-
ties it performs, but objects are no
longer interchangeable. It becomes
important that a particular object
perform these functions and their
visual proxim.ity is requisite. In
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V. Depression. m addition to features
already described in Stage IV, feelingsOf guilt, shame, and an enduring sense
of one's weakness emerge. Absent, how-
ever, are two cardinal aspects of adultdepression; hopelessness and despair
Restitution of the loss frequently failsto resolve the manifestations of depres-
sion. Defensively, a self-punitive pos-ture IS a potent feature.
Adolescent Depression
. Along with thefeatures of Stage V, adolescent depres-
sion is marked by cognitive egocentrism,
feelings of worthlessness
, hopelessness,
urgency and desperation, and an inability
to modulate affective expression. The
earlier the presumed developmental
arrest or regression, the more likely
are acting-out and suicidal gestures and
the more prolonged or repeated are the
particular symptoms. However, depres-
sions originating in adolescence do not
necessarily involve acting upon impulses
although a heightened awareness of sexual
and aggressive impulses does characterize
the stage.
VII. Adult Depression
. Aspects unique to
adolescent depression, such as cognitive
egocentrism and the inability to modulate
affective expression, diminish. The means
of handling separation and losses are
established as characterological reper-
toires which tend to generalize to the
management of many forms of distress.
If the current formulation is apt, advances in the level
of object representation should parallel the proposed stages
of the mourning sequence. The level of object representa-
tion should become increasingly differentiated, articulated,
stable, and integrated (Blatt, Brenneis, Schimek, &
Click, 1976) . Additionally, the level of representation
should advance from predominantly sensory-motor (Stages
I-II) to concrete-perceptual (Stages II-III) to iconic-
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V. Depression. in addition to features
of^'aun/^^S''"''^^ ^^^^^ feelingsr guilt, shame, and an enduring senseof one s weakness emerge. Absent, how-ever, are two cardinal aspects of adultdepression; hopelessness and despairRestitution of the loss frequently failsto resolve the m.anifestations of depres-
sion. Defensively, a self-punitive pos-ture IS a potent feature.
Adolescent Depression
. Along with thefeatures of Stage V, adolescent depres-
sion is marked by cognitive eaocentrism,feelings of worthlessness
, hopelessness,
and despair, an overwhelming sense of
urgency and despair, and an inability to
modulate affective expression. The
earlier the presumed developmental
arrest or regression, the more likely
are acting-out and suicidal gestures and
the more prolonged or repeated are the
particular symptoms. However, depres-
sions originating in adolescence do not
necessarily involve acting upon impulses
although a heightened awareness of sexual
and aggressive impulses does characterize
the stage.
VII. Adult Depression
. Aspects unique to
adolescent depression diminish. Added to
earlier stages are hopelessness and des-
pair. The means of handling separation
and losses are established, characterologi-
cal repertoires which tend to generalize to
the management of many forms of distress.
If the current formulation is apt, advances in the level
of object representation should parallel the proposed stages
of the mourning sequence. The level of object representa-
tion should become increasingly differentiated, articulated,
stable, and integrated (Blatt, Brenneis, Schimek, &
Click, 1976) . Additionally, the level of representation
should advance from predominantly sensory-motor (Stages
I-II) to concrete-perceptual (Stages II-III) to iconic-
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external (stage IV) to iconic-internal (stage V)
, and
finally to conceptual-symbolic (Stages VI-VII) levels
Statement of the Probl em
The present investigation explores the nature of the
relationship between levels of object representation and
a proposed model of the stages of distress management in
response to loss or separation among adolescents and young
adult psychiatric in-patients. While a significant rela-
tionship is anticipated for both adolescents and young
adults, the impact of chronological age within this age
segment can be examined. Further, other potentially inter-
vening variables are explored; sex, diagnostic category,
extent of clinical depression, depressed mood, the fre-
quency and intensity of recent and past life events, the
type of event (object loss versus distressful, but non-
loss-related events), the recency of the event, and the
source of information about the reactions. Thus, the
following hypotheses will be examined:
1. A significant positive relationship between
the level of object representation and the
stage of distress management in response to
loss or separation will be shown.
2. The strength of the relationship between
the level of object representation and the
stage of distress management will vary
according to a number of intervening vari-
ables. Thus, it is expected that object
representation will show a stronger corre-
lation with the level at which a) recent
as opposed to temporally more distant
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or separations as opposed to stressful,but not directly object-loss-related
tTsTlfT^J^T^/''^'' responded to, andc) self-reported as opposed to observed
responses to events are presented.
3. Lower levels of object representation willbe significantly correlated with the actionpole of a continuum from action to ideation-al modes of managing actual distress.
4. Diagnostic category (psychotic, borderline,
or character disordered)
, depressive symp-toms, and one's history of life events willshow a lower, but significant relationship
to the level of self-reported and observed
responses to distressing events than object
representation.
5. Sex, age, and depressed mood will show no
systematic relationship to the level of
self-reported and observed responses todistressing events.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
Thirty- two psychiatric inpatients, 16 females and 16
males equally distributed by sex between adolescents (13
to 17 years of age) and young adults (18 to 35 years of
age) were randomly selected from psychiatrically hospital-
ized adolescents and young adults at the Yale Psychiatric
Institute in New Haven, Connecticut. The Institute is a
small private psychiatric hospital affiliated with the
Yale University School of Medicine. Patients are predomi-
nantly Caucasian and of middle to upper class background,
and of diverse geographic origins. Patients have generally
received some form of psychological assistance prior to
their admission to the Institute and many have been pre-
viously hospitalized. The patient population is diverse
diagnostically; however, there is considerable commonality
regarding the modes of assessment and treatment. Patients
receive psychological testing within the first several
weeks of admission. All patients participate in intensive
individual, family, group, and milieu treatment. School
and/or in-hospital and outside work programs are provided
to each patient. The means by which subjects were
selected for the present study is described below.
86
87
Psychiatric residents administratively responsible for
patients' care were requested to submit names of patients
for whom participation in research was clinically contra-
indicated. One patient who was severely psychotically
disorganized at the time of the study was thereby eliminated
from the potential sample.
The principal investigator then made a series of
announcements to the patient community regarding the ini-
tiation of the project, a brief description of the research,
the random selection of subjects, and the nature of the
patients' participation. Initially, eight female and eight
male adolescents were randomly selected from the adolescent
patient population of the hospital. Following the selec-
tion of the adolescent sample, eight fem.ale and eight male
adults were randomly selected from the adult patient popu-
lation. These thirty- two patients were then approached
individually by the principal investigator to request their
participation and answer procedural questions. For those
who agreed to participate, the consent form was then read
and signed and two ninety minute appointments were arranged.
The second appointment was scheduled at least one week, but
no more than three weeks from the first appointment time.
Of the thirty-two patients from whom participation was
requested, refusals were obtained from two adolescent males,
one adult male, and one adult female. In addition, one
adolescent fem.ale was excluded from the original random
sample because she had eloped from the hospital and was
therefore unavailable to receive the invitation to partici-
pate. Five subjects from the respective subpopulations
were subsequently randomly selected from the remaining
patient population to replace those who were unavailable.
Family therapists were requested to and obtained parental
consent from the parent or guardian of all adolescent volun-
teers
.
Experimenters
The principal experimenter and interviewer is a Cau-
casian female graduate student in clinical psychology in
her mid- twenties. Four research assistants, two male and
two female Caucasian college-educated volunteers were
trained as raters by the principal investigator. They
range in age from twenty-one to twenty-five.
The first male/female pair of raters (A) were ini-
tially instructed in the scoring of the Rorschach for level
of object representation devised by Blatt, Brenneis,
Schimek, and Click (1976) . Three two-hour training ses-
sions were provided in order to review the training manual
together, score sample Rorschach protocols, discuss areas
in which agreement was poor, and to arrive at satisfactory
levels of inter-rater reliability. After the scoring of
the actual Rorschach data the A raters were retrained to
score stories from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)
according to Blatt 's (1974) criteria for level of object
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representation. A second set of three two-hour training
sessions of similar format to the first set were provided.
The second male/female pair of raters (B) were trained
in four two-hour training sessions to score verbatim writ-
ten records of interviews describing distress events
according to the presently proposed model of the stages of
depression. The B raters were told that the model des-
cribed stages of distress management generally, without
explicit mention of loss or separation. The description
of stages was rewritten to exclude the explicit mention of
loss by replacing it with "distress". After the
interviews were scored, the B raters were retrained to
score nursing progress notes for an either predominantly
action or an ideational mode of managing distress. Two
two-hour training sessions were given. Both the first and
second training sessions followed a format similar to that
of the first pair of raters.
Research assistants were blind to the subject's iden-
tity, the subject's scores on other measures, the experi-
mental hypotheses and the tasks of those with whom they
were not paired.
A fifth individual, the research associate, is a
twenty-seven year old Caucasian male graduate student in
clinical psychology. He had been previously trained and
had applied the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) to YPI
patients ' hospital records immediately prior to the present
investigation. rdc diagnostic ratings for subjects in th
present study were obtained from him.
Materials
The variables and tests used to measure the variable
are as follows: a) object representation is measured by
both the Rorschach and Thematic Apperception Test Object
Representation Scales; b) diagnostic category is assessed
by the Research Diagnostic Criteria; c) depressed mood is
measured by the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List;
d) severity of depression or depressive symptoms is mea-
sured by the Self-Rating Depression Scale; e) the impact
of life events is measured by a modified version of the
Life Events Survey; f) self-reported distress management
is determined by applying the Distress Management Scale (DMS)
to life events descriptions; and g) the level of observed
distress management is measured by applying the behavioral
component of the DMS to progress notes (see p. 104). These
measures, described below, were administered to all subjects.
Consent form
. (See Appendix A) . The consent form con-
sisted of a brief description of the study, the nature of
the subjects' participation, the possible risks and bene-
fits of participation, and the right to discontinue without
deleterious effects at any point in their participation.
Rorschach Ink Blot Test, Object Representation Scale
(R-OR)
. The R-OR is a scoring system for Rorschach human
responses developed by Blatt, Brenneis, Schimek, and Click
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(1976) and grounded conceptually in a Wernerian theory of
cognitive development (Werner, 1948; Werner & Kaplan, 1963).
Three primary dimensions are scored-dif ferentiation, arti-
culation, and integration, within each dimension, a con-
tinuum of subcategories from low to high developmental
level determines the relative weight of the subcategory
score to the total score for the dimension. The scale is
scored in the positive direction so that the higher the
score for each dimension, the higher the level of develop-
ment. The dimensions and their subcategories are as fol-
differentiation is scored according to the nature
of the response. The subcategories, beginning with the
lowest weighted, are partial details of quasihuman figures,
partial details of human figures, full quasihuman figures,
and full human figures; b) articulation is scored for
the specification of perceptual (size, posture, clothing)
and functional details (age, sex, role, specific identity)
.
Functional details are considered more developmentally
advanced than perceptual details and are thus given greater
weight in determining the articulation dimension score;
c) integration of the response is scored in four ways:
1) the degree of internality of the motivation of the action
(unmotivated, reactive, intentional)
, 2) the degree of in-
tegration of the object and the action (fused, incongruent,
nonspecific, congruent)
, 3) the nature of the integration
of the interaction with another object (active-passive.
active-reactive, active-active), and 4) the content of the
integration of the interaction with another action (male-
volent, benevolent), within each of the four areas, scores were
weighted from developmentally lower to higher levels as listed.
Blatt et al. (19 76) found that these formal properties of
Rorschach human responses show consistent changes with
development and differential impairments that are related
to the severity of psychopathology
. They report inter-
rater reliability for the scoring system within acceptable
ranges.
Thematic Apperception Test, Object Representation
Scale (TAT-QR)
. The TAT-OR is a scoring system derived
by the investigator from the theoretical work of Blatt (1974),
the elaboration of a scoring system for descriptions (Blatt,
1976), and its empirical application to parental descrip-
tions (Blatt, Wein, Chevron, & Quinlan, 1979) . Three TAT
cards, 14, 13 MF, and 3 BM, were chosen from the standard
set of TAT cards based on the depressing tone of the cards,
the equal proportion of female and male figures depicted
across the three cards, and the distribution of cards across
the beginning, middle, and end of the test. Each of the
three cards are rated according to Blatt 's (1976) scoring
system which is conceptually based on Piaget's (1937)
theory of cognitive development. The levels are assigned
scores with higher scores given to higher levels of object
representation such that the higher the score, the higher
the level of development. The score for each of the three
cards are added to derive a total TAT-OR score. The levels
are as follows: a) Sensorimotor-Preoperational
. An object
is described primarily by her/his activities in reference
to the gratification or frustration s/he provides. Their
description has a personal, subjective focus and there is
little sense of the object as a separate and independent
entity; s/he is defined primarily in terms of the pleasure
or pain s/he provides the subject. b) Concrete-Perceptual
.
An object is defined as a separate entity, but the defini-
tion is primarily in concrete, literal, often physical
terms. The description is relatively global and its emphasis
is primarily placed on what the object literally looks like
in its external characteristics or physical properties.
Partial attributes or features are not appreciated,
c) Iconic . The iconic level consists of two sublevels,
external and internal, the latter being a relatively higher
level of representation. Objects described at the external
iconic level are based primarily on their functional attri-
butes and the unique activities which exist independent of
any direct or explicit reference to the gratification or
frustration s/he provides the subject. Objects described
at the internal iconic level are also based on their attri-
butes and properties, but not in terms of actions or func-
tions. Rather, attributes refer to internal dimensions
such as values, thoughts, and feelings. In both the external
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and internal iconic levels, the descriptions are unidimen-
sional. They do not include the complexity of actions,
feelings, or values in which there are various levels (e.g.,
manifest versus latent feelings). The description of the
object is without conjunctivity or dis junctivity
, complexity,
or a sense of time (historical past, present, and an antici-
pation of the future). There is not subtlety, apparent
contradiction, complexity, or development over time. d) Con-
ceptual. An object is described in a way that integrates
all the prior levels; the total description indicates a
wide range of levels in which the object is understood and
experienced. The internal is understood both in its own
right as well as in contrast with the external. An appreci-
ation for change and variation over time may be included.
A variety of dimensions are integrated such that apparent
contradictions are resolved and an integrated, complex
synthesis is formed. Blatt et al. (1979) found that the
scoring system for the conceptual level of representations
can be scored reliably and that the conceptual level of
representation of parents is significantly related to the
type and degree of depression from nondepressed
,
introjec-
tive, mixed anaclitic-intro jective , and anaclitic.
Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) . The RDC
,
developed
by Spitzer, Endicott, and Robins (1975), is a diagnostic
system based on a Kraepelinian model. Symptoms and the
duration of illness are the central factors in determining
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the diagnosis. Items related to each diagnostic category
are presented in checklist format and the criteria for
classification are outlined. Spitzer et al. (1975) have
shown the RDC to be a valid and reliable diagnostic measure.
Since semistructured interviews to determine subjects' RDC
diagnosis were not feasible, the RDC was applied to informa-
tion contained in subjects' hospital records. While the
data gathered in this way are expected to be less reliable
and complete than interview data, the validity and reliab-
ility of the measure is assumed to remain adequate. One
revision of the RDC was made by the present investigator
in order to establish a borderline diagnostic category.
Subjects who only minimally met the criteria for schizo-
phrenia (2-3 symptoms) and who also met the criteria for
borderline features were classified as borderline rather
than schizophrenic.
Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL)
,
Depres -
sion Scale (DCL) . (See Appendix B) The MAACL (Zuckerman &
Lubin, 1965) provides independent measures of three negative
affect states— anxiety, hostility, and depression. It con-
sists of 132 adjectives describing both positive and nega-
tive affects. Subjects are instructed to circle only those
adjectives which apply to them at the time of administration.
The adjectives are listed in alphabetical order. The depres-
sion scale (DCL) of the MAACL consists of 40 items: 20 plus
and 20 minus items. The DCL is scored in the positive
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direction. The reliability and validity of the DCL as a
measure of state depression has been demonstrated for
adult and adolescent psychiatric patients (Lubin, 1965;
Zuckerman, Lubin, Vogel, & Valerius, 1964).
Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS) . (See Appendix C)
The SDS, developed by Zung (1965), is designed to measure
the severity of clinical depression. It consists of 20
items to which the subject responds as true to himself,
"A little of the time," "Some of the time," "Good part of
the time," or "Most of the time." Half of the items are
phrased in the negative. Responses are assigned a numeri-
cal value from 1 to 4 so that a higher score reflects
greater severity. The items tap into the affective, bio-
logical, and psychological areas of disturbance. Zung
(1965) has shown the SDS to be a reliable and valid measure
of depression for adult psychiatric patients.
Life Events Survey, Modified (LES-M) . (See Appendix D)
The LES-M is a modification of the LES developed by Sarason,
Johnson, and Siegel (1978) to measure life changes. The
LES is a 57-item self-report measure which allows the res-
pondent to indicate the events they have experienced in
the past year and the nature and intensity of impact on
the respondent at the time the event occurred on a 7-point
scale ranging from -3 (extremely negative) to +3 (extremely
positive). Three scores are obtained from the measure. A
Positive Change Score is derived by summing the impact
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ratings of those events designated as positive by the sub-
^ Negative Change Score is derived by summing the
impact ratings of those events designated as negative by the
subject. A Total Change Score is obtained by summarizing
the positive and negative change scores. Sarason et al.
have demonstrated the reliability and validity of the LES
for both normal and psychiatrically treated college students.
Object loss and non-object loss events were differentiated
by the investigator and another judge. Agreement was ob-
tained on 92% of the items. Items on which agreement was
not reached were considered non-object loss events. Object
loss (separation) event was defined as the permanent or
temporary separation or reasonable anticipation of separa-
tion from another individual. Further, since no subjects
in the present study had been or were presently married,
items having to do with the respondents' marriage or spouse
were eliminated. In addition, a section of 21 items in-
quiring about changes specific to hospital-related events
were added to the end of the LES, giving a total of 76
items. Additionally, the LES was modified to allow the
respondent to indicate events which happened at any point
in time by replacing the time period heading to read, "Date."
Events which occurred less than one year from that date were
designated Present Events. Positive, negative, and total
change scores were computed separately for past and present
events
.
order for each rater. This pattern was repeated for sub-
jects' stories for TAT cards 13 MF and 3 BM, respectively.
Diagnoses were obtained for siabjects using the RDC as
it was applied to information contained in patients' hos-
pital records by the research associate. At the time of
determining the diagnoses, the research associate was unaware
of which patients had volunteered for the present study,
subjects' scores on other measures, and experimental
hypotheses
.
The principal investigator remained blind to subjects'
scores on either of the two measures of level of object
representation and to subjects' RDC diagnoses.
Initial Interview
For each subject, the Charge Nurse of the ward was
consulted regarding the patient's clinical status just
prior to the initial interview. On this basis three initial
interviews were rescheduled. Of these, two were rescheduled
due to the patient's assaultiveness (a female adult and a
male adolescent) and the third due to the patient's
suicide potential (a female adolescent)
.
Subjects were escorted from their wards to the prin-
cipal investigator's office by the investigator for the
initial interview. Subjects were seated at a desk at a
right angle to the investigator. A questionnaire packet
was placed before both the investigator and subject. The
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packet consisted of the MAACL, SDS, and LES-M in this same
fixed order for all subjects. The following instructions
were given by the investigator:
Before you is a set of questionnaires. Ihave the same questionnaires in front of
me. I will give you the instructions for
each quesionnaire as we go along. Let's
look at the first one. Read along with
me as I read aloud the instructions printed
at the top of the page.
After reading the printed instructions, the investigator
solicited and answered procedural questions. Subjects then
completed the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (See
Appendix B)
.
After completing the MAACL, the investigator
stated:
Now let's go on to the next questionnaire.
Listen carefully as I give you the instruc-
tions. As you can see the questionnaire
consists of twenty statements printed on
the left side of the page and the statements
"a little of the time," "some of the time,"
"good part of the time," and "most of the
time" on the right side of the page. Read
each statement on the left and then put a
check mark in the box which corresponds to
the way in which that statement applies to you.
Procedural questions were solicited and answered. Subjects
then filled out the Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale (See
Appendix C) . The last questionnaire was then presented.
Now let's go on to the last questionnaire.
Read along with me as I read aloud the
instructions printed at the top of the page.
After reading the instructions and soliciting and answering
questions, the investigator explained:
I will go through the questionnaire with
you and write down your answers on my
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copy. You may follow along with me.
The investigator then administered the Life Experiences Sur-
vey as modified by the present investigator (See Appendix D)
.
Following the completion of the questionnaire packet,
subjects' second interview appointment was reconfirmed.
The investigator then escorted the subject back to her/his
ward.
Subjects' MAACL and SDS were concealed from the inves-
tigator to be scored anonymously following the second inter-
view. Then for each subject, their responses to the LES-M
were reviewed by the investigator in order to choose four
events based on three criteria: impact, type of event (object
loss or non-object loss) and the date of the event (past or
present)
.
Present events were restricted to the period
of time since admission to YPI so that the patients' prog-
ress notes could be subsequently analyzed. Thus, for each
subject four events were selected from their LES-M, all of
which were subjectively rated as having had an extremely
negative impact (-3) on the individual at the time the
event occurred and which were distributed as follows:
a) one object loss-related event which occurred more than
one year from the date the study was initiated (LO-PS)
;
b) one object loss-related event which occurred both less
than one year from the date the study was initiated and
since admission to YPI (LO-PR) ; c) one non-object loss-
related event which occurred more than one year from the
date the study was initiated (NL-PS) ; and d) one non-object
loss-related event which occurred both less than one year
from the date the study was initiated and since admission
to YPI (NL-PR)
.
When more than one event met the criteria
for any of the four categories (LO-PS, LO-PR, NL-PS, NL-PR),
an attempt was made to match for the date closest to that
of its contrasting type within the same temporal frame
reference (past or present)
. In cases where the above
criterion failed to definitively determine the choice of
event, one event was randomly chosen from among those
meeting the criteria for the category. The four events
were then randomly ordered for presentation to the subject
in the second interview.
Second Interview
The pre-interview procedure for screening subjects'
clinical status for the initial interview was repeated for
the second interview. As a result, one adolescent male
subject who eloped briefly from the hospital was rescheduled
upon his return.
Subjects were escorted to the investigator's office
from their wards and seated at a desk at a right angle to
the investigator. The following instructions were then
given
:
As you may recall from the description of
the study that I gave you, I will now ask
you to describe several of the events that
you mentioned in our first interview. Please
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describe each one as fully and as completely
as you can remember it. Any questions?
Once questions about the task were answered, the investiga-
tor presented each of the four randomly ordered events by
stating
,
You mentioned that in (month, year)
happened. Please tell me everything you
remember about it and I will write down what
you say.
After all four events had been described, the investigator
explained,
Now I would like to go back over each event
to make sure that I understand what you've
told me.
Each event was reviewed to clarify factual details and elicit
data which could be helpful in determining the stage of dis-
tress management if it had not been given without prompting.
Care was taken to ask questions which were as open-ended
and noncommittal as possible.
Subjects were then invited to give their reactions to
the study as a means of both obtaining information about
hypotheses subjects might have formed and assessing the
need for further debriefing. Subjects were told that the
investigator would contact them to explain the study in
more detail once the interviews were completed. They were
encouraged to approach the investigator if any questions or
concerns arose prior to that time. Subjects who appeared
distressed, but who declined the offer to discuss their
reactions further were encouraged to discuss their concerns
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with their psychotherapist. The investigator requested
that the nature of the tasks remain confidential, thanked
the subject for participating, and escorted him/her
back to her/his ward.
The date of present events (LO-PR and NL-PR) were
recorded and progress notes for the week following the
event were extracted from the patient's hospital record.
In general, approximately half-page long progress notes
are written every 2-3 days on each patient by her/his
primary nurse. Notes are to contain summaries of the
patient's behavior and affective state, significant events,
and contacts with the patient in a standard format. Thus,
for each patient, a set of progress notes (2 notes for
each week, 2 weeks for each subject) was obtained. in six
cases, the week of the object loss-related and non-object
loss-related event overlapped. In these instances the same
score for observed mode was assigned for the object loss
and non-object loss-related events.
The descriptions of the events were given to each of
the B raters to score for the stage of distress management
in the same random order. The B raters were then retrained
to score the progress notes for the observed mode of
managing distress (action to ideational)
. The progress
notes were then presented in another random order to the
B raters for scoring.
Approximately two weeks following the second interview.
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the investigator checked in with subjects to evaluate any
residual effects of participation in the study. Finally,
at the conclusion of the study, written feedback describing
the intent, results, and implications of the study and an
invitation to contact the investigator regarding further
questions was distributed to subjects (See Appendix E)
.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
In general, results confirmed major hypotheses. Most
measures of object representation were consistently posi-
tively and significantly correlated with measures of the
stage of distress management of object loss events. Vari-
ables for which a mediating influence were anticipated did
not show consistent relationships to measures of distress
management. Life events did not show a significant rela-
tionship to distress management, while diagnostic category
was significantly related to some measures of distress
management. The severity of clinical depression corre-
lated negatively and significantly with most measures of
distress management, as hypothesized. As expected, cor-
relations of depressed mood with measures of distress
management were not significant. As anticipated neither
age nor sex of subject was significantly related to mea-
sures of distress management.
Interrater reliability coefficients were computed for
subjects' scores on the Rorschach and Thematic Apperception
Test Object Representation Scales and the distress manage-
ment measures. For the Rorschach Scale, the interrater
reliability coefficients were: a) differentiation,
r=1.00; b) articulation, r=.84; c) integration, r=.66.
Interrater reliability for the Thematic Apperception Test
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Object Representation Scale was r=.95. For the Self-
Reported Distress Management Scale, interrater reliability
coefficients were: a) past object loss events,
.99;
b) present object loss events, 1.00; c) past non-object
loss events,
.97; and d) present non-object loss events,
1.00. The interrater reliability for the Observed Dis-
tress Management were
.90 and .95 for object loss and non-
object loss events, respectively. m summary, adequate
levels of reliability were obtained for ratings on the
measures. Disagreements between raters were resolved in
conference. The lower reliability of ratings of Rorschach
scale integration scores relative to other measures is
likely a consequence of factors inherent in the measure.
Unlike most of the other measures, the integration score
is a composite of many separately-scored subscales.
Subjects ranged in age from 15 to 34 years old. The
mean age was 20.16. Subjects in the adolescent group
ranged in age from 15 to 17 years old with a mean age of
15.81. Subjects in the adult group ranged in age from 18
to 34 with a mean age of 24.50. Means and standard devia-
tions of subjects' scores on both the Rorschach and TAT
measures of object representation for adolescents, adults,
and the combined sample are presented in Table 1. Means
and standard deviations of subjects' scores on measures of
distress management for adolescents, adults, and the com-
bined sample are presented in Table 2. One way analyses
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TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Subjects' Scoreson Measures of Object Representation for
Adolescent and Adult Groups
^^^^^re Adolescents Adults Total
Rorschach Object Represent-
ation Scale
Differentiation
Mean 33,34 32,57 32.96Standard Deviation 8.08 9.04 8^44
(n=16) (n=16) (n=32)
Articulation
M^^" 18.60 23.22 20.91
Standard Deviation 11.75 8.91 10.52
(n=16) (n=16) (n=32)
Integration
Mean 79.29 75.81 77.55
Standard Deviation 20.50 33.48 27.37
(n=16) (n=16) (n=32)
Thematic Apperception Test
Object Representation Scale
Mean 6.91 7.03 6.97
Standard Deviation 1.88 1.93 1.87
(n=16), (n=16) (n=32)
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TABLE 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Subjects' Scoreson Measures of Distress Management for
Adolescent and Adult Groups
Measure Adolescents Adults Total
Self-Reported Distress Management
Object Loss
Past Events
Mean
Standard Deviation
Present Events
Mean
Standard Deviation
Non-Object Loss
Past Events
Mean
Standard Deviation
Present Events
Mean
Standard Deviation
Observed Distress Management
(Present Events Only)
Object Loss Events
Mean
Standard Deviation
Non-Object Loss Events
Mean
Standard Deviation
3.37 2. 81 3. 09
1.75 1. 91 1. 82
(n=16) (n= 16) (n= 32)
3. 19 3. 06 3. 13
1.94 1. 91 1. 90
(n=16) (n= 16) (n= 32)
2.50 3. 13 2. 81
1. 32 1. 26 1. 31
(n=16) (n= 16) (n= 32)
3.44 2. 63 3. 03
1.41 1. 09 1. 31
(n=16) (n= 16) {n= 32)
1.44 1. 50 1. 47
.51 52 51
(n=16) (n= 16) (n= 32)
1. 31 1. 56 1. 44
.48 51 50
(n=16) (n= 16) (n= 32)
of variance were performed to test for the effect of age
on measures of distress management. Results are presented
in Table 3. As predicted in Hypothesis 5, no F-values
reached significance. The data for adolescent and adult
subjects were therefore combined for subsequent analyses.
Sixteen female and 16 male subjects participated in
the study. Means and standard deviations of subjects'
scores on measures of object representation and measures
of distress management for females and males are presented
in Tables 4 and 5. One way analyses of variance were per-
formed to test for the effect of sex of subject on measures
of distress management. Results are presented in Table 6.
As predicted in Hypothesis 5, no F-values reached signifi-
cance, allowing for the pooling' of female and male subjects
scores for subsequent analyses.
Hypothesis 1 predicted a significant positive rela-
tionship between the level of object representation and the
stage of distress management in response to loss or separa-
tion. Pearson correlation coefficients were computed for
each dimension of the Rorschach Object Representation Scale
and the Thematic Apperception Test Object Representation
Scale with self-reported distress management ratings for
the four types of events. Results are presented in Table 7
Only the correlation between the integration dimension of
the Rorschach scale and distress management for past object
loss events failed to confirm the hypothesis. Differentia-
Ill
TABLE 3
One Way Analysis of Variance
Effect of Age of Subject
Source df F
Self-Reported Distress Management
Object Loss
Past Events 1^30 o.76
Present Events 1,30 o.03
Non-Object Loss
Past Events 1,30 i.ss
Present Events 1,30 3.32
Observed Distress Management
(Present Events Only)
Object Loss Events 1,30 0.12
Non-Object Loss Events 1,30 2^03
39
85
18
08
73
16
TABLE 4
Means and Standard Deviations for Subjects' Scoreson Measures of Object Representation for
Female and Male Groups
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Measure Female Male
Rorschach Object Representation Scale
Differentiation
Mean
Standard Deviation
Articulation
Mean
Standard Deviation
Integration
Mean
Standard Deviation
Thematic Apperception Test Object
Representation Scale
Mean
Standard Deviation
33. 67
9 .50
(n=16)
22.83
11.93
(n=16)
73.99
32.66
(n=16)
6.97
1.79
32.25
7.48
(n=16)
19.00
9 . 79
(n=16)
81. 11
21.31
(n=16)
6.97
2.01
(n=16) (n=16)
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TABLE 5
Means and Standard Deviations for Subects ' Scores
on Measures of Distress Management for
Female and Male Groups
Measure
Self-Reported Distress Management
Object Loss
Past Events
Mean 3,63
Non-Object Loss Events
Female Male
2.56
Standard Deviation 1.86 1.67
(n=16) (n=16)
Present Events
Standard Deviation 1.94 1.91
(n=16) (n=16)
Non-Object Loss
Past Events
Mean 2.63 3.00
Standard Deviation 1.31 1.32
(n=16) (n=16)
Present Events
Mean 3.44 2.63
Standard Deviation 1.41 1.09
{n=16) (n=16)
Observed Distress Management
(Present Events Only)
Object Loss Events
Mean 1.56 I.37
Standard Deviation .51
.50
(n=16) (n=16)
Mean 1.50 1.37
Standard Deviation .52 .52
(n=16) (n=16)
TABLE 6
One Way Analysis of Variance:
Effect of Sex of Subject
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Source
Self-Reported Distress Management
Object Loss
Past Events
Present Events
Non-Object Loss Events
Past Events
Present Events
df
1, 30
1,30
1,30
1,30
2.89
0.03
0.65
3. 32
.10
. 85
.43
.09
Observed Distress Management
(Present Events Only)
Object Loss Events
Non-Object Loss Events
1, 30
1, 30
1. 10
.48
.30
.49
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tion, articulation, and the Thematic Apperception Test Ob-
ject Representation Scale were positively and significant-
ly correlated with distress management for object loss e-
vents. Further, as predicted in Hypothesis 2a, correlation
coefficients were higher for present than for past events,
although the difference between the correlations approachld
significance only in the case of differentiation (t=1.87,
P < .10, trend) for object loss events. in addition, as
anticipated in Hypothesis 2b, object representation was
more highly correlated with self-reported distress manage-
ment scores for object loss than non-object loss events,
although the correlations of distress management of non-
object loss present events with both differentiation and
integration reached significance. The difference between
correlations for past object and non-object loss events
approached significance for the differentiation measure
(t=1.82, p < .10, trend) and reached significance for the
Thematic Apperception Test measure (t=2.27, £ < .05). in
regard to present events, significant differences between
correlations with differentiation (t=2.27, p < .05) and ar-
ticulation (t=2.20, p < .05) and distress management scores
of object loss versus non-object loss events were found.
Thus, in general, the higher one's level of object represen-
tation the higher the stage at which distress in regard to
object loss and, to a lesser extent, non-object loss dis-
tress is handled.
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed to
examine the relationship between self-reported and observed
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measures of distress management. Results are presented in
Table 8. Both past and present self-reported distress
management of object loss events were positively and sig-
nificantly correlated with observed measures for both
object loss and non-object loss-related events. Of the
other self-report measures only the correlation between
past non-object loss events and observed distress manage-
ment of non-object loss events reached significance.
Thus, the measures of self-reported distress management
are related to observed distress management for object
loss events while the relationship between self-reported
and observed measures holds only weakly for the non-object
loss events.
Hypothesis 3 predicted a positive correlation between
the level of object representation and the observed dis-
tress management. To test this hypothesis, Pearson corre-
lation coefficients were computed for scores on measures
of object representation and the observed distress manage-
ment scores. Results are presented in Table 9. In general,
they confirm the hypothesis. Only the Thematic Apperception
Test Object Represtation Scale failed to correlate sig-
nificantly with the level of observed distress management
for object loss events. All three dimensions of the Ror-
schach Object Representation Scale correlated positively
and significantly for object loss events. Correlations
between the level of the observed distress management for
TABLE 8
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Matrix forSelf-Reported and Observed Measures of
Distress Management
(n=32)
Observed Distress Management
Object Non-Object
Loss Events Loss Events
Self-Reported Distress
Management
Past Events
Object Loss '^"^ •52
.02* .001***
Non-Object Loss
Present Events
Object Loss
Non-Object Loss
23
.32
10 .03*
44 .48
006** .003**
22 .17
11 .17
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
119
TABLE 9
Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix forMeasures of Object Representation andObserved Distress Management
(n=32)
Observed
Distress Management
Object Non-Object
Loss Events Loss Events
Measure
Rorschach Object
Representation Scale
Differentiation
r
P
Articulation
52
001***
35
02*
r
P
Integration
r
P
43
006**
38
016*
26
07
24
09
Thematic Apperception
Test Object Represen-
tation Scale
r
P
22
11
31
05*
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
non-object loss events and both differentiation and the
Thematic Apperception Test Object Representation Scale
reached significance. However, when tests for the differ-
ence between correlations of object representation mea-
sures and self-reported versus observed distress manage-
ment were performed, only the difference between the
Thematic Apperception Test Scale and object loss versus
non-object loss events approached significance (t=1.94,
P < .10, trend). Thus, support for Hypothesis 3 is pro-
vided by the Rorschach, but not by the Thematic Appercep-
tion Test measure of object representation. The higher
one's level of object representation as measured by the
Rorschach, the more ideational the mode of managing dis-
tress associated with the loss of an object. A tendency
in the same direction was unexpectedly found for observed
managing of non-object loss-related events.
Means and standard deviations for subjects' scores
on initial interview measures are presented in Table 10.
To test the prediction of no significant relationships
between depressive symptomatology or depressed mood and
distress management, Pearson correlation coefficients were
computed. Results are presented in Table 11. As predicted,
no significant relationship between scores on the Multiple
Affect Adjective Checklist Depression Scale were obtained.
However, the scores on the Self-Rating Depression Scale
correlated negatively and significantly with the level of
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TABLE 10
Means and Standard Deviations forInitial Interview Measures
(n=32)
Past Events
Present Events
Measure
^^^^
Standard
Deviation
Depression Check List 19.06
Self-Rating Depression Scale 42.13
Life Events Survey—Modified
Positive 23.06
Negative
Total
Positive 17.97
Negative 35178
Total
8.42
11.11
13.57
30.59 15.75
54.16 25.24
11.03
24 . 23
53,75 30.04
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TABLE 11
Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix for
Measures of Depression and Measures of
Distress Management
(n=32)
DCL SDS
Self-Reported Distress Management
Object Loss
Past Events
r
P
Present Events
r
P
-0
. 21
. 13
0. 23
. 10
-0. 20
.14
0.39
.01**
Non-Object Loss
Past Events
r
P
Present Events
r
P
0.16
.19
0 . 28
.06
0.21
. 13
0.22
. 11
Self-Reported Distress Management
(Present Events Only)
Object Loss Events
r
P
Non-Object Loss Events
r
P
-0
. 17
. 17
-0. 18
. 16
0. 35
.02^^
-0
. 40
.01**
*p < .05
**p < .01
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self-reported distress management for present object loss
events, and observed distress management both object loss
and non-object loss events. However, correlations of the
Self-Rating Depression Scale with self-reported distress
management were significantly different from and generally
lower than object representation measures (except integra-
tion) for both past and present object loss events, but
not non-object loss events. For self-reported distress
management of past object loss events, differences between
correlations were: differentiation, t=2.59, p < .05;
articulation, t=2.41, p < .05; Thematic Apperception Test
Scale, t=2.74, p < .05. For self-reported distress manage-
ment of present object loss events, differences between
correlations were: differentiation, t=4.75, p < .001;
articulation, t=3.62, p < .01; integration, t=2.65, p < .05;
Thematic Apperception Test, t=3.60, p < .01. On the
observed measure of distress management, differences
between correlations for object loss events were: differ-
entiation, t=3.32, p < .01; articulation, t=2.87, p < .01;
integration, t=2.73, p < .05; Thematic Apperception Test
Scale, t=1.90, p < .10, trend. Similarly, differences
between correlations of the observed measure for non-object
loss with the Self-Rating Depression Scale versus those
with measures of object representation were: differentia-
tion, t=2.69, p < .05; articulation, t=2.69, p < .05; inte-
gration, t=2.35, p < .05; Thematic Apperception Test Scale,
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t=2.50, p < .05. Summarizing, the severity of depressive
symptomatology has a moderate inverse relationship to dis-
tress management as compared to the level of object repre-
sentation in the present investigation. For present events
then, the more severe depressive symptomatology, the lower
the level of self-reported distress management for object
loss events and the more action-oriented the observed means
of managing distress.
Table 12 presents the means and standard deviations
for scores on measures of distress management by Research
Diagnostic Criteria diagnostic category. Hypothesis 4
which predicted a positive relationship between diagnostic
category and distress management measures was tested by
computing Pearson correlation coefficients. The predicted
relationship was supported for the management of object
loss events only.
Although no prediction was made regarding the relative
strength of the relationship between the level of object
representation and diagnostic category on one hand and dis-
tress management on the other, differences between correla-
tions were tested. While in general correlations were
higher for measures of object representation than for
diagnostic category, only the correlation between differen-
tiation and self-reported distress management of present
object loss events revealed a significant difference,
(t_=2.22, p < .05). To summarize, diagnostic category as
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measured by the revised RDC bears a relationship to dis-
tress management scores which is somewhat weaker than that
of object representation.
In Hypothesis 5, a moderate relationship between the
life events history and distress management measures was
anticipated. Pearson correlation coefficients used to
test the hypothesis are presented in Table 13. No sig-
nificant relationship was found. One's history of life
events does not appear related to the self-reported or
observed distress management. To further assess the rela-
tionship between life events and distress management, Pear-
son correlation coefficients were computed separately for
past and present, positive and negative events with mea-
sures of distress management. Results are presented in
Table 14. The Life Events scores for present negative
events was positively and significantly correlated with
self-reported distress management for non-object loss
events in the present. The greater the impact of present
negative events the higher the level of self-reported
managing of non-object loss-related events. No other sig-
nificant relationships were found.
Although one way analyses of variance showed no sig-
nificant effect of age on measures of distress management,
Pearson correlation coefficients were recomputed with the
variability due to subjects' age partialed out to test for
the effect of age on the correlations found. Results are
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TABLE 13
Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix forDiagnosis, Total Past and Present Life Events Scores,
and Measures of Distress Management
{n=32)
RDC
Self-Reported Distress Management
Object Loss
Past Events
r
P
Present Events
r
P
Non-Object Loss
Past Events
r
P
Present Events
r
P
,45
.
005**
,31
,04^
.19
, 15
,12
,25
LES-M
Past
Total
,05
,38
15
20
,01
,47
,25
,08
LES-M
Present
Total
,26
,07
,03
44
15
21
, 26
,08
Observed Distress Management
(Present Events Only)
Object Loss Events
Non-Object Loss Events
r
P
04
42
,04
,41
11
27
21
13
, 12
,25
03
43
*p < .05
**p < .01
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presented in Table 15. As observed in the unpartialed
correlations, only the correlation of the integration
dimension of the Rorschach Scale with distress management
for past object loss events failed to confirm Hypothesis 1.
When the effect of age was partialed out, differentiation,
articulation, and the Thematic Apperception Test Object
Representation Scale were positively and significantly
correlated with distress management of both past and pre-
sent object loss events. Further, the relatively higher
coefficients for present as opposed to past object loss
events were also found when the variability due to age was
partialed out. Additionally, as was the case in the un-
partialed correlations, object representation was more
highly correlated with distress management scores of object
loss than non-object loss events, although the correla-
tions of distress management of non-object loss events
with both differentiation and integration reached signifi-
cance. Thus, results of partialing out the effects of age
revealed correlation coefficients virtually identical to
those for the unpartialed data, and conclusions remain
unchanged
.
Similar results were found when the variables due to
severity of depression, past and recent life events his-
tories, and diagnosis were separately partialed out.
Results for each control variable are presented in
Tables 16-19, respectively. Correlation coefficients
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remained virtually unchanged from the zero-order partials.
An overview shows that results support the predicted
relationships. Certain finer distinctions, however, were
revealed. While in general positive and significant rela-
tionships between level of object representation and stage
of distress management were found, some measures of object
representation showed a stronger, more significant rela-
tionship. The Rorschach differentiation scale was both
the strongest and most consistently related measure; the
integration scale was the weakest and least consistently
related to distress management. In part, the relative
weakness of correlations with the integration scale is
likely a function of the complexity of its measurement
referred to earlier, rather than the nature of the con-
struct itself. The Thematic Apperception Test Scale
revealed the clearest distinction between object loss and
non-object loss events on the self-report measure of dis-
tress management, but correlated in an inverse pattern for
observed distress management. In regard to anticipated
relationships between object representation and past ver-
sus present event, the differentiation scale showed the
clearest distinction, although the articulation scale
yielded similar results. Self-reported distress management
of object loss, but not non-object loss events was posi-
tively and significantly correlated with observed distress
management measures. With respect to expected differences
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in the strength of the relationships between measures of
object representation and self-report versus observed mea-
sures of distress management, results did not confirm the
hypothesis. overall, then, the more basic relationship
between level of object representation and stage of dis-
tress management is somewhat, but not significantly,
attenuated by the content or temporal frame of reference
of the event or the source of information about responses
to it as measured by the present study.
Reviewing the effect of individual differences vari-
ables on the predicted relationships, only those which
directly bore on the severity of clinical condition showed
a systematic relationship to the stage of distress manage-
ment. Sex, age, history of life stress, and depressed
mood state were not significantly related to measures of
distress management nor did they significantly affect the
strength or direction of other relationships. On the other
hand, both the diagnostic category as measured by the modi-
fied Research Diagnostic Criteria and the severity of
clinical depression as measured by the Self-Rating Depres-
sion Scale showed limited but significant relationships to
the stage of distress management. By and large, differences
between correlations of the Research Diagnostic Criteria scores
and level of object representation measures with distress
management measures were not significant. Severe depres-
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sion was significantly related to relatively lower levels
of distress management for present events only. Generally
speaking, differences between correlations of the Self-
Rating Depression Scores and object representation measures
with distress management measures were significant. in
spite of several independent significant relationships
between diagnosis, depression, life events history, and
age with distress management, separately partialing out
the variability accounted for by each did not attentuate
the relationship between object representation and self-
reported or observed distress management.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The present study explored the relationships between
factors presumed to influence one's capacity to bear
separation or loss of an object and a proposed developmental
model of depression in a psychiatric population. Principal-
ly, the intent of the investigation was two-fold. First,
it was an initial attempt to provide support for the
validity of the proposed model of depression. Second,
assuming the validity of the model and its measurement, the
study was intended to offer support for the role of cogni-
tive object relational factors in depression. As dis-
cussed below, although results must be viewed cautiously,
they are generally consistent with both main objectives.
While the proposed model was based on a large and
respected body of theoretical and empirical work, estab-
lishing its validity will depend upon repeated applica-
tions to empirical questions. The present study, however,
offered indications of convergent validity. Most striking,
when a measure derived from the model was applied to des-
criptions of responses to object loss events, positive and
significant correlations with observed reactions to stress
were found. Thus the stage, according to the model, at
which one describes reactions to past or present object
losses related to the manner in which stressful events are
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actually managed as observed by others. The more advanced
the stage, the more likely is the reaction predominantly
ideational rather than action-oriented. in addition, the
severity of depression was positively and significantly
correlated with the stage at which present object losses
were described. As would be anticipated then, the more
severely depressed individuals are more likely to describe
present loss events at less advanced stages. Finally,
diagnostic category, presumably a more stable measure than
the severity of depression, was positively and significantly
related to the stage at which object loss events, present
and past, were described, such that the more serious the
psychological disturbance, the less advanced the stage at
which object loss events are described. In summary, the
application of the model to descriptions of responses to
object loss events revealed relationships to actually
observed reactions, severity of depression, and severity of
psychopathology which support the validity of the model.
Thus, although much further validation is necessary, the
assumption of its validity is tentatively reasonable.
The advantages of a valid and reliably measurable
developmental model of depression over most traditional
models are considerable. Based on normal development, a
developmental model allows for the assessment of both
qualitative and quantitative deviations from age-appropriate
norms. The thorny theoretical arguments about the
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appropriateness of equating adult depressive syndromes to
similar syndromes in younger populations is thereby averted.
Similarly, confusion and inconsistencies as a consequence
of the proliferation of typologies of depression are avoided.
Although object loss is used as the prototypical depression-
inducing event, the model does not a priori restrict itself
to object loss. It is multidimensional and descriptive,
drawing on observations from the realms of object relations,
behavior, affect, cognition, and defensive functioning.
Thus, major theoretical approaches may be easily integrated.
Finally, the model is equally applicable across develop-
mental eras and independent of other psychiatric disorder.
These advantages have vast implications for the study
of depression. Most basically, a developmental model allows
for the systematic investigation of hypotheses regarding
the role of development in later depressive illness. These
hypotheses may include the timing and co-ordination of
individual, familial, and cultural factors with respect to norma-
tive developmental progression on the capacity to bear
object loss. In regard to individual factors, for example,
the role of parallel versus divergent maturation across
areas of development may be explored and mechanisms specific
to depression identified. The impact of specific aspects
of development, such as object representation in the pre-
sent instance, may be examined over time or cross-sectionally
.
The processes by which early learning is repeated and
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transformed in later life is made accessible to study.
Finally, the generalizability of a paradigm of distress
management derived from the study of loss and separation to
the management of other depression-inducing experiences,
experiences more generally, or to other psychiatric dis-
orders may be explored.
Application of results from studies of a developmental
model of depression is potentially enriching of both the
theory and treatment of depression. Theoretically, a
developmental model ties the study of depression to a
substantial body of knowledge of human development. Addi-
tionally, such a model helps to understand depression as
a process rather than a static entity and further, as a
process ordered by developmentally determined sequences in
the acquisition of complex sets of functions. These
theoretical advances may have benefits for treatment.
Among them, deficits particularly relevant to depression
may be more easily identified and assessed. Interventions
tailored to the amelioration of stage-specific difficulties
may be drawn from knowledge of normative development. Fur-
ther, interventions may be integrated within the framework
at a developmental level, making treatment both rational
and comprehensive. Finally, progress may be evaluated by
reference to progressively more advanced stages of bearing
separations
.
The second major thrust of the present study was toward
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support of the role of cognitive object relational factors
in depression. As discussed earlier, the integration of
cognitive developmental theory and psychoanalytic object
relations theory represents an important contribution to
psychological knowledge. By itself, object relations theory,
while richly descriptive, has suffered from a lack of broad
empirical evidence. Conversely, theories of cognitive
development have a strong empirical foundation, but are
divorced from the m.eaningful familial or social contexts
in which learning occurs. In spite of the considerable
divergence between the two literatures, interest in internal
representation of objects represents a significant point of
intersection. Moreover, object representation has also been
theoretically linked to depression. Object representation
is then a crucial variable with which to begin exploring a
cognitive object relational approach.
The role of other factors, those traditionally associ-
ated with the capacity to handle distress, were also exam-
ined. Of interest were age, sex, recent and past history
of life events, depressed m.ood, severity of depressive
symptomatology, and diagnosis, both as they were independ-
ently related to distress management and as they affected
the relationship between the level of object representation
and the stage of distress management.
Results supported the hypothesized relationship between
object representation and the management of distress.
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particularly with respect to differentiation. in general,
the greater the degree of differentiation, articulation,
and integration of the representation and the more symbolic
and conceptual, the more advanced the stage of managing
distress. In contrast to anticipated results, the content
(object loss versus non-object loss), temporal frame of
reference (past versus present) , and the source of informa-
tion about reactions (self-reported versus observed) did
not significantly attenuate the relationship between object
respresentation and distress management. As previously
noted, however, aspects of object representation were dif-
ferentially related to distress management. Although these
differences were small, they are of interest for preliminary
investigations. Differentiation was the most strongly and
consistently related of all measures. At least two explana-
tions are possible. First, of the four object representa-
tion measures, differentiation was the least complex and
ambiguous. Its measurement thus most likely contained
the least extraneous "noise." Apart from measurement issues,
however, the nature of the construct itself may contribute
to its breadth and strength. Differentiation at the high-
est level, the full human form, is an early developmental
achievement relative to full articulation, integration, or
symbolic functioning. In addition, it is likely to be
relatively more stable and refractory to psychological dis-
tress. Deficits in differentiation are thus more likely
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to reflect dramatic psychological disruptions which in turn
broadly interfere with the capacity to cope with distress.
Clarification must await further research.
The Thematic Apperception Test measure appeared most
sensitive to the content of the event. For self-reported
distress management the higher the level of object represen-
tation, the more advanced the stage of distress management
for object loss, but not non-object loss-related events.
However, for observed measures of distress management,
higher levels of representation were significantly associ-
ated with non-object loss but not object loss events. Both
the similarity in format and the choice of depressively-
toned TAT cards help to explain the differential relation-
ship between the Thematic Apperception Test Scale and
self-reported distress management for object loss versus
non-object loss events. By contrast, perhaps given its
generally weaker relationship to observed distress manage-
ment, the broadening of the range of events improved the
correlation between the Thematic Apperception Test Scale
and observed distress management for non-object loss events
relative to object loss events.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the distinction
between object loss and non-object loss distressing events
did not reveal salient differences. The distinction was
particularly blurred in relation to present events. Several .
interpretations are reasonable. First, the necessity of
making a priori categorizations of events lead to several
non-object loss events in which object losses played a
significant role. For example, one subject for whom a
major financial setback was considered a non-object loss
event subsequently described the financial setback as a
function of separating from her parents. Further, most
non-object loss distressing events may be said to imply
the loss of another's love or esteem if not their physical
presence. Thus, for instance, failing an important examina-
tion while it does not directly suggest object loss is often
associated with the fear of the loss of a significant other's
esteem. Moreover, the simple threat of or actual absence
of the object does not adequately reflect the quality of
the relationship which may be at least as important as its
endurance. Yet another possible factor in the lack of
differentiation of object loss and non-object loss events
may be the overriding salience of distress per se. Although
this perspective is tenable, previously discussed mitigating
factors seem more fundamental. Last, the relationship
between variables such as object representation and distress
management may not tap into dimensions along which object
loss and non-object loss events differ. The contributions
of each of these factors cannot be presently determined.
The relationships between major variables and distress
management of present as opposed to past events were not
significantly different. A number of factors may have
played a part. The validity and reliability of the Life
Events survey for assessing past events is not established.
Anecdotally, severely depressed subjects appeared to report
more events in general, and subjectively rate the impact of
present events more negatively and past events more posi-
tively than the average. Character disordered subjects
seemed to report fewer events and subjectively rate their
impact as less extreme than the average. The extent to
which such variations created systematically and signifi-
cantly different populations of events from which to mea-
sure past versus present distress management is not known.
The decision to classify events on the basis of more versus
less than one year from the date of the current investiga-
tion was arbitrary and may not accurately reflect a mean-
ingful temporal distinction. Perhaps more crucially, events
classified as past may in fact have occurred closer to the
psychological testing, the basis for object represen-
tation measures, than present events. The salience of details
of present events may have clouded actual distinctions bet-
ween past and present events. Conversely, since all sub-
jects were in intensive therapy, the memory of affectively
charged past events may have been unusually keen. The
principal investigator's staff position in the hospital
may have influenced the ways in which subjects described
events, deleting certain aspects either to conceal sensi-
tive material or because they assumed the investigator was
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familiar with it, or en4.ellishing particular features to
influence the investigator's attitudes. AH of the limi-
tations of retrospective data are inherent in the reporting
of the events. since subjects were in treatment and to
some extent psychology-wise, one might assume a tendency
to present themselves in their best light, particularly
Vis-a-vis past events. Several presumably important fac-
tors were not controlled for in choosing the events, in-
cluding the subjects' age at the times of the event, the
historical time during which past events occurred, the
amount of time between past and present events, the amount
of time since the present event, or differentiations of
types of events within categories. Assessment of the
role of each of these mitigating factors may further clari-
fy the hypothesized relationships to the distress manage-
ment of past and recent events.
Self-report and observed measures of distress manage-
ment did not significantly differ in their relationships
to other major variables. This result may be attributable
to factors other than the actual correspondence of verbal
reports and observed behavior and of both measures with
major variables. Although research assistants were blind
to subjects' scores on other measures, one set of research
assistants scored both the self-report and observed measures.
Their ability to assign observed scores based on knowledge
of self-report scores is, however, improbable. They
reported that they were unable to recall or match subjects'
self-report measure with their observed measures. Addi-
tionally, many, perhaps most observed data did not make
explicit reference to the present events under scrutiny.
More likely, positive correlations between self-reported
and Observed measures may be in part a reflection of the
reliance of nursing staff on patients' verbal reports
rather than actually observed behavior for progress notes.
However, in view of the different measures applied to self-
report and observed measures as well as the extent to which
nursing staff are generally in contact with patients, these
factors appear insufficient to account for the association
between self-report and observed measures and their rela-
tionships to other variables.
Turning to the role of clinical features, diagnoses,
broadly speaking, revealed specific independent relation-
ships to the stage of distress management. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, diagnostic category was significantly related
to object loss events, but not non-object loss events. In
other words, the more severe the diagnosis, the poorer the
distress management of object loss as opposed to non-object
loss events. Apart from reasons mitigating against pre-
suming an actual distinction between object loss and non-
object loss events, other interpretations may be entertained.
If one postulates that psychotic patients are more likely
to reveal their psychosis with respect to object loss rather
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non-object loss events, then raters may have scored the
psychotic subjects' descriptions of object loss events
lower as a function of the presence of psychotic material
rather than the level of distress management. One may
postulate the disproportionate influence of the ways in
which object loss events are handled as opposed to non-
object loss events on subsequent diagnosis. On the other
hand, one's diagnosis may disproportionately affect the ways
with which object loss as opposed to non-object loss
events are subsequently contended. Either interpretation
is feasible, but neither is confirmed. The strength of
the relationship between diagnosis and distress management
was weaker but did not significantly differ overall from
that of object representation, although neither did it
affect the relationships between object representation and
other measures. Both diagnosis and object representation
then bear relationships to distress management. While this
is not surprising given a shared developmental foundation,
the nature of the relationships require further delineation.
It remains reasonable to assume that the level of object
representation is associated with distress management by
virtue of a mediating role in the process while diagnosis
corresponds to distress management by virtue of similar
descriptive features.
The severity of depression was negatively significantly
related to measures of distress management in the present.
The more severely one is depressed, the less advanced is
one's capacity to manage present distress. As previously
noted, the distinction between past and present events is
minimal and may be clouded by a variety of extraneous fac-
tors. Nonetheless some speculations as to the meaning of
the differential relationship to present versus past events
are in order. Most simply explicated, the significant
correlations with the distress management of present events
may reflect the temporal proximity of the measurements.
Several other possibilities exist. Severely depressed
individuals may differentially perceive and/or report past
versus present events. Earlier comments suggested that
depressives may overestimate the negative impact of present
events, and thereby artificially deflate distress manage-
ment scores. The extent to which the relatively stronger
correlation with present events is a function of measure-
ment rather than construct features cannot be presently
evaluated. In general the strength of the relationships
between depressive symptoms and measures of distress
management were significantly weaker than those of object
representation. Tentatively then, depression, while re-
lated to the ways in which distress is handled is not as
potent as object representation.
Remaining variables (age, sex, history of life events,
and depressed mood) showed no significant relationships to
distress management as presently measured. The degree to
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which this accurately reflects the nature of the relation-
ships demands on-going assessment with other populations.
In conclusion, the study provided limited support for
the validity of a proposed developmental model of depres-
sion and for the mediating role of object representation
within the model. A valid and reliably rated develop-
mental model has significant advantages over other approaches,
the implications of which are both theoretically and clini-
cally compelling. Future research is necessary to support
its validity, particularly for non-psychiatric, non-white,
and lower socio-economic populations. Links to other
theoretical orientations must be more carefully delineated
and empirical support for its predictive utility remains
to be established.
Of the measures of object representation the differ-
entiation scale of the Rorschach measure was most powerful
and consistently related to the developmental model. The
Thematic Apperception Test Scale, a newly adapted measure
of object representation, showed promise in its relationship
to the model, particularly with respect to the differentia-
tion of object loss and non-object loss reactions. How-
ever, in general, situational variables, the content,
temporal frame of reference, and source of information did
not reveal significant difference about the relationship
between object representation and distress management.
Further exploration of situational factors is important in
order to clarify a multitude of measurement and construct
questions. Tentatively, however, the relationship between
Object representation and the stage of distress management
overrides situational characteristics.
Individual difference variables related to clinical
status were significantly related to measures of distress
management. The more severe the diagnosis and depres-
sive symptoms the lower the level of distress management
of object loss and present events, respectively. The
nature of the interrelationship among object representation,
diagnosis, depressive, and distress management is a crucial
area for further research.
Conclusions must be viewed cautiously, but with optim-
ism. Results cannot be generalized currently beyond a
relatively young, severely disturbed, Caucasian, middle
class psychiatric population. Many methodological issues
mitigate against clear-cut conclusions. Research designs
which permit the generation of causal inferences may help
clarify a number of the theoretical issues discussed. Addi-
tionally, larger samples may also further delineate hypothe-
sized relationships. Future research, however, holds the
promise of a developmental model of depression in which the
mediating role of cognitive object relational factors are
integrated within a complex and comprehensive theoretical
and clinical approach.
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APPENDIX A
CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN A RESEARCH PROJECT
YALE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
YALE PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTE
Invitation to Participate and Description of Project :
You (your son or your daughter) are invited to par-
ticipate in a study of men and women who are currently
patients at the Yale Psychiatric Institute. The purpose
of this study is to determine what factors contribute to
the way that you think back on ordinary events in one's
life. This information will be helpful in understanding
how people cope with past experiences. Most current
patients were invited to participate. If you choose to
participate, you will be invited to talk with the research-
er, a psychologist on the YPI staff. Your participation
in filling out 2 short questionnaires and 2 brief interviews
(each about h hour in length) will be requested. The inter-
views will be written down verbatim and the material will
be kept in a locked file. Participation in this study in-
cludes permission to study information from your YPI records.
The results of the study will be kept completely con-
fidential and anonymous to everyone other than the inter-
viewer. No one else will be granted access to personally
identifiable information from the interview, questionnaires,
or your records.
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It is assumed that the primary risk to you would be
the possible stress of being reminded of certain experi-
ences; however, every effort will be made to make your
participation in the study comfortable and rewarding for
you. You may benefit from the opportunity to reflect on
events in your past with an experienced clinician. Addi-
tionally, you may benefit from the feeling of having con-
tributed to knowledge in the field of psychology. Further,
you will be offered a chance to learn of the results of
the study which may provide insight into steps toward your
recovery.
You are free to decide whether or not to participate
and you may withdraw from the study at any time. A deci-
sion not to participate will in no way adversely prejudice
your interactions with YPI. Before you sign this form,
please ask any questions on any aspect of this study that
are unclear to you. You will receive a copy of the con-
sent form.
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Authorization :
I have read the above and decide that
will participate in the project descrih^H .k""^""^ °^ subject)
Signature
Relationship (self, parent, guardian, etc.)
Date
Signature of Principal Investigator Telephone
or
Signature of Person obtaining consent Telephone
Signature of Parent, Guardian, or Next of Kin
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APPENDIX B
ADJECTIVE CHECK LIST
Below you will find words which describe different kinds ofmoods and feelings. For each word, decide whether or notIt describes how you feel now. If it does, circle the num-ber next to the word. If F^ord does not describe yourpresent feeling, then do NOT circle the number next to theword Because you will only circle the number correspondingto those Items which describe how you feel, you will notcircle some items. Therefore, please check frequently to
make sure that you are marking the correctly numbered item.Some of the words may sound alike, but we want you to mark
all the words that describe your feelings. Work rapidly
1. active 21. cheerful
2. adventurous - 22. clean
3. affectionate 23. complaining
4 . afraid 24. contented
5. agitated 25. contrary
6. agreeable 26 . cool
7. aggressive 27. cooperative
8. alive 28. critical
+ 9 . alone 29. cross
10 . amiable 30 . cruel
11. amused 31. daring
12. angry 32 . desperate
13. annoyed + 33. destroyed
+ 14. awful 34. devoted
15. bashful 35. disagreeable
16. bitter 36. discontented
+ 17. blue + 37. discouraged
18 . bored 38 . disgusted
19 . calm 39 . displeased
20 . cautious 40. energetic
+ scored positively on depression scale
scored negatively on depression scale
41. enraged
42. enthusiastic
43. fearful
44. fine
45. fit
46. forlorn
47. frank
48. free
49. friendly
50. frightened
51. furious
52. gay
53. gentle
54. glad
+ 55. gloomy
- 56 . good
57. good-natured
58. grim
59. happy
60. healthy
+ 61. hopeless
62. hostile
63. impatient
64. incensed
65. indigent
- 66. inspired
- 67. interested
68. irritated
69 . jealous
70. joyful
71. kindly
+ 72. lonely
+ 73. lost
74. loving
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+ 75. low
- 76. lucky
77. mad
78. mean
79. meek
- 80. merry
81. mild
+ 82. miserable
83. nervous
84. obliging
85. offended
86. outraged
87. panicky
88. patient
- 89. peaceful
90. pleased
91. pleasant
92. polite
93. powerful
94. quiet
95. reckless
+ 96. rejected
97. rough
+ 98. sad
- 99 . safe
100. satisfied
101. secure
102. shaky
103. shy
104. soothed
105. steady
106. stubborn
107. stormy
108. strong
109. suffering
110. sullen
111. sunk
112. sympathetic
113. tame
114. tense
116. terrible
117. terrified
118. thoughtful
119. timid
120. tormented
121. understanding
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+ 122. unhappy
123. unsociable
124. upset
125. vexed
126
. warm
- 127. whole
128. wild
129. willful
+ 130. wilted
131. worrying
- 132. young
APPENDIX
SELF-RATING SCALE
181
1. I feel down-hearted and blue
2. Morning is when I feel the best
3. I have crying spells or feel
like it
4. I have trouble sleeping at
night
5. I eat as much as I used to
6. I still enjoy sex
7. I notice that I am losing
weight
8. I have trouble with
constipation
9. My heart beats faster than
usual
10. I get tired for no reason
11. My mind is as clear as it
used to be
12. I find it easy to do the
things I used to do
13. I am restless and can't keep
still
14 . I feel hopeful about the
future
15. I am more irritable than usual
16. I find it easy to make
decisions
17. I feel that I am useful and
needed
18. My life is pretty full
19. I feel that others would be
better off if I were dead
20. I still enjoy the things I
used to do
A
little
of
the
time
Some
of
of
the
time
Good
part
of
the
time
Most
of
the
time
APPENDIX D
THE LIFE EXPERIENCES SURVEY
18 3
Listed below are a number of events which sometimes bring about
change in the lives of those who experience them and which neces-
sitate social readjustment. Please tell me those events which you
have experienced in the recent or distant past and indicate the
date that you experienced each event.
Also, for each item, please indicate the extent to which you
viewed the event as having either a positive or negative impact
on your life at the time the event occurred. That is, indicate
the type and extent of impact that the event had. A rating of -3
would indicate an extremely negative impact. A rating of zero
suggests no impact either positive or negative. A rating of +3
would indicate an extremely positive impact.
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Section 1
(0 ) 1. Detention in jail or com-
parable institution
(0 ) 2. Major change in sleeping
habits (much more or much
less sleep)
(1) 3. Death of close family
member:
a. mother
b. father
c. brother
d. sister
e. grandmother
f. grandfather
g. other (specify)
(0) 4. Major change in eating
habits (much more or
much less food intake)
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 + 3
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
-3 -2 -1 0 + 1 +2 + 3
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
Non-object loss events
Object loss events
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(1) 5. Death of close friend
-3 -2 _ 1 u + 3
5
.
uutstandmg personal
achievement
— J — Z -
1
0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0 ) 7. Minor law violations
(traffic tickets, dis-
turbing the peace, etc.) -3 -2
-1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0 ) 8 . '^"--c. "ire/Qirxmend s
pregnancy
_ T
— Z - i 0 + 1 + 2 + 3
(0) 9. Female: Pregnancv
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0) 10. Changed work situation
(different work respon-
sibility, major change
in working condition,
wording nours, etc.) -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0 ) 11. New job
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
(0) 12. Serious illness or injury
of close family member:
a. father
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
b. mother
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
c. sister -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
d. brother
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
e. grandfather -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
f. grandmother -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
g. other (specify) -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0 ) 13. Sexual difficulties -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0 ) 14 . Trouble with employer
(in danger of losing
job, suspended, demoted.
etc.
)
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0) 15. Major change in finan-
cial status (a lot better
off or a lot worse off) -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0/1) 16. Major change in closeness
of family members (in-
creased or decreased
closeness) -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
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(0) 17. Gaining new family mem-
ber (through birth, adop-
tion, family member moving
-3
-2 -1 0 +1 +2
(1) 18. Change of residence
-3 -2
-1 q +1 +2
(1) 19. Marital separation of
parents (due to conflict)
-3 -2
-l 0 +1 +2
(0) 20. Major change in church
activities (increased or
decreased attendance)
-3 -2
-l 0 +1 +2
(0) 21. Marital reconciliation
of parents
_3
_2
_i q +1 +2
(0) 22. Major change in number of
arguments with family (a
lot more or a lot less
arguments)
_3
_2 -1 q +1 +2
(0) 23. Major change in usual
type and/or amount of
recreation
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2
(0) 24. Borrowing more than
$10,000 (buying home,
business, etc.)
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2
(0) 25. Borrowing less than
$10,000 (buying car, TV,
getting school loan, etc.) -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2
(1) 26. Being fired from job -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2
(1) 27. Male ; Wife/girlfriend
having abortion -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2
(1) 28. Female : Having abortion -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2
(0) 29. Major personal illness
or injury -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2
(0/1) 30. Major change in social
activities, e.g., par-
ties, movies, visiting
(increased or decreased
participation) -3
-2 -1 0 +1 +2
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Date
(0) 31. Major change in living
conditions of family
(building new home,
remodeling, deteriora-
tion of home, neighbor-
hood, etc.)
(1) 32. Divorce of parents
(1) 33. Serious injury or ill-
ness of close friend
(0) 34. Retirement from work
of parent
(1) 35. Brother or sister
leaving home (due to
marriage, college, etc.)
(0) 36. Ending or formal schooling
(1) 37. Separation from spouse
(due to work, travel, etc.)
(0) 38. Engagement
(1) 39. Breaking up with boyfriend/
girlfriend
(1) 40. Leaving home for the
first time
(0) 41. Reconciliation with
boyfriend/girlfriend
Other recent experiences which have
had an impact on your life. List
and rate .
42.
43.
44.
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3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 + 3
3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
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Section 2: Student Only
(0) 1. Beginning a new school
experience at a higher
academic level (college,
graduate school, profes-
sional school, etc. -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0) 2. Changing to a new school
at same academic level
(undergraduate, graduate,
etc. ) -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0) 3. Academic probation -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(1) 4. Being dismissed from
dormitory or residence -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0) 5. Failing an important exam -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0) 6. Changing future education-
al or vocational plans -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0) 7. Failing a course -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0) 8. Dropping a course -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(0) 9. Financial problems concern-
ing school (in danger of
not having sufficient funds
to continue) -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
Section 3i Hospital Related
Events
(1) 1. Change of roommate
(1) 2. Change of floor
( 1) 3. Change of ward group
administrator
( 1) 4. Change of individual
therapist
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
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(1) 5. Change of family therapist -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 J. T
r0 . Change of primary nurse or
aide
— J z -
1
0 + 1 + 2 +3
W ) n1 . Change of medication -3 -2 -1 0 + 1 + 2 + 3
(0/1) 8
.
Change of composition of
ward group _ 3 _2 _ TX nu J. T "TO
(1
)
9 . Vacation or prolonged
absence of individual
therapist -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(1) 10. Vacation or prolonged
absence of family
therapist -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(1 ) 11. Vacation or prolonged
absence of ward group
administrator -3 -2 -1 0 + 1 + 2 + 3
(1) 12. Move to H.I. of close
friend -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(1) 13. Discharge of close friend -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(1) 14, AWOL of close friend -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(1) 15. 5-day paper of close
friend -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(1) 16. Suicide attempt of close
friend -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(1) 17. Close friend put in seclu-
sion -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(1) 18. Personal 5-day paper -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(1) 19. Personal AWOL -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(1) 20. Suicide attempt -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
(1) 21. Seclusion -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 + 3
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APPENDIX E
FEEDBACK TO SUBJECTS
Thank you for participating in the study! I will
explain the purpose of the study. I was interested in
learning about factors which influence how people cope
with stressful experiences, especially those involving
separation from or loss of another person. The factors I
studied were the kinds of images one has of others, sever-
ity of depression, mood, one's life history of stress, age,
and sex.
The results of the study showed that an individual's
image of others is related to how they handle stress, par-
ticularly separations or losses. The more accurately,
realistically, and completely one perceives others, the
better one copes with stress. Diagnosis was also related
to the ability to cope with stress. Those who had more
severe psychological difficulties had more serious problems
handling stress. Also, the more severely one is depressed,
the relatively more difficult it is to cope with stress.
On the other hand, the study did not show a relationship
between age, sex, mood, or the impact of past stresses and
the capacity to handle stress. Further research is required
to confirm these conclusions.
The results of the study may be valuable in better
helping people to deal with stress. For example, developing
190
more realistic and complete perceptions of others may help
them better cope with distressing situations.
Please feel free to contact me if you have any fur-
ther questions or comments. And thanks again.
Sincerely,
Bobbi Fibel


